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1. Introduction

Since the end of the Second World War, intrastate wars or civil wars – have been the dominant form of violence. 20 percent of all nations have experienced at least ten years of civil war during the last 50 years, and in the world's poorest region, Sub-Saharan Africa, almost a third of the countries entered the 90s with active civil wars (Blattman & Miguel, 2010: 4). These wars bring massive destruction to their countries, societies and citizens, and the social, psychological and economical costs last for many years.

2. A Theory of Rebels' Motivation

The literature on civil wars is extensive and has expanded dramatically the last half of a century. Studies have been conducted trying to explain the consequences of civil wars, its causes and even how to succeed strategically (for an overview, see Goodwin et al., 2009; Blattman & Miguel, 2010). The literature on consequences has shown how civil wars affect future investments and physical assets (e.g., Rodrik, 1999; see however, Cerra & Saxena, 2008); health and human capital (Bundervoet et al., 2009; Shemyakina, 2006); political and social institutions (e.g., Sambanis, 2007; Bellows & Miguel, 2006); and several other indicators. The overall conclusion has been clear: "Civil wars wreak mass destruction of infrastructure and livelihoods as well as lives" (Keen, 2010: 12).

This conclusion has throughout the last couple of decades fuelled the research on the causes of civil wars. Several approaches have been taken, among which the most dominant have been one of motivation (see however the feasibility perspective, Collier et al., 2006) and the international relations perspective, Vinci, 2006). Thus, studies have been collected on the motivation of different players, including the government and

Ross, 2006) As Murshed & Tadjoeeddin describe it, "greed is about opportunities faced by the rebel group" (2009: 89). A rebel is said to be driven by greed when he or she is motivated by economic opportunities, such as looting and military salaries. As Keen writes, this suggests that "war may dovetail into crime and we [therefore] need to rethink the relationship between the two" (Keen 2000: 283). Collier's approach thus fostered an understanding of rebels as mainly just criminals, which have led Duffield (2001) among others (e.g., Bøås & Dunn, 2007) to criticize this approach for unfairly delegitimizing all rebellions.

If we term a rebel's "rational responses" as an act of greed (Bøås & Dunn, 2007: 4)

2001: 9) as well as it has been proven to be the case across different decision situations, including voting behavior (Glenn, 2004), consumer choice (

temporal dimension distinguishing between the situation facing rebels before the outbreak of a civil war and under the course of one.

2.3.1 The outbreak of civil war: Passion as the trigger

As Collier pointed out, every beginning of a civil war is characterized by a “

with the outbreak of civil war, while chronic poverty has not (Miguel et al., 2004; Goodhand, 2003). People's decision to start a civil war is a response to the disappointment and perceived injustice of declining welfare; a response of frustration and anger towards the people they find responsible (Nafziger & Auvinen, 2000: 96).

my to attack Gios and Manos, and Taylor unleashed his forces on Krahn and Mandingos, which made up most of Doe's supporters (Bøås, 2005: 80).

The key to understanding the outbreak of the Liberian civil war lies in understanding the motivation behind those tens of thousands ordinary Liberians who left their homes and chose to start a civil war. They were not fighters or extremist; they lived "quite ordinary Liberian lives", 60% went to school and 25% were working (Bøås & Hatløy, 2008: 33, 41). The only thing they had in common, except to a large extent their ethnic background, was "a strong aversion to the incumbent president, Samuel Doe", rooted in the unfair and ethnic-based allocation of resources and political positions (Johnston, 2008: 121; Ellis, 1995: 166). This together with the indiscriminate violence which Doe initiated after the failed coup attempt in 1985 created so strong grievances towards the regime and the Krahn

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survived “by engaging in battles against each other and accessing valuable natural commodities as well as looting consumer goods” (Hegre et al., 2009:608). During 1995 foreign involvement increased, including military presence from The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1996, six years after the death of Doe, Taylor signed a peace agreement after refusing to attend any negotiations since the outbreak of the war –

reason-based motivation would not have been able to drive the rebellion (ibid.: 267). As will be argued below, this reasoning is mistaken, and rational incentives did indeed affect the course of the war.

4.2.1 The outbreak: Peasants into rebels—reaching the breaking point

In 1962, the National Reconciliation Party (NRP), dominated by the army and landowners, rigged an election and took power (Dutta, 1982: 7). This was the first of a range of fraud elections throughout the 1960s and 1970s. A small group of left-wing guerillas, the Popular Front of Liberation (FPL), which had fought the government for many years before NRP took power, intensified its operations in this period. The guerilla group grew and in 1974 they succeeded in mobilizing the peasant organization especially the Christian Federation of Salvadoran Campesinos (FECCAS) to participate in a range of large demonstrations against the unfair living costs and standards (Wood, 2003: 91). As a response to these events (and scared by the revolution just started in neighboring Nicaragua), General Romero,

sustain the war (Johnson, 1997: 786). Stanley does stand somewhat alone with these findings and a broader view of the literature on the Salvadoran war does not give much credit to economic incentives, suggesting that these do not explain the entire twelve years of continuous warfare. However, this does not mean that rebels cannot have been motivated by reason. The application of a broad

5. Discussion of Evidence and Findings

The conclusions arriving from the Liberian and Salvadoran cases tend to support the main argument of this paper: that passion triggers civil war, while reason sustains it. Thus, ordinary people became rebels in Liberia mainly motivated by grievances towards the regime that had carried out indiscriminate violence among certain ethnic groups; and they continued to fight to sustain a civil war that had turned into an industry actually improving the life of the people inside the rebellion. The same tendencies were present in the otherwise very different case of El Salvador. The outbreak was caused by ordinary peasants' grievances towards a regime that for several years had worsened their lives through unfair policies and later indiscriminate violence. They kept fighting partly due to continued dissatisfaction with the system –passion-based motivation– but mostly due to the opportunity to achieve political powerful positions in organizations outside the rebellion. The purpose of this chapter is to zoom out and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of this evidence and the conclusions derived from it in the light of other case material and alternative explanations.

The tendencies in the Liberian and Salvadoran civil wars are not unique. Cater (2003) for instance did a “rethinking” of three cases normally associated with greed –Angola, Sierra Leone and DRC– and found that economic benefits did not arrive until late in the conflict. Another Latin American case, Colombia might stand as one of the most paradigmatic cases for this paper's argument. It

the fact that the distinction between prewar, outbreak and continuation should be thought fluidly. Second, loyalty within certain groups of people, including those in a rebellion, also turned out to be a factor that could motivate people. This feeling of community could both be a source of a passionate act, as it is the case when you feel deeply attached to a group (e.g., Wood, 2001: 271,) but could also be a factor carrying value in a rational calculus in the form of the inherent value of one's social connections (e.g., Theidon, 2009: 17.)

By presenting a theoretical framework encompassing both the outbreak and continuation of civil war, this paper succeeds in distinguishing its argument from previous ones. As has already been pointed out, neither the greed nor the grievance theories are appropriate when it comes to explaining changes in rebels' motivation. The clear tendencies towards a change from passion-based to reason-based motivation will be hard to explain by these theories. Other theoretical frameworks simply avoid theorizing on parts of the causation. Among those frameworks is Collier and collaborators' feasibility theory, which moves beyond the motivational approach in explaining civil wars, and simply states that "where civil war is feasible it will occur" (2006: 2). They argue, that lootable resources might not play a role as motivation for rebels, but simply enable them to fight. However, as it has been shown in this paper, rebels do take the opportunities they are facing into serious consideration when choosing their level of obedience to their leaders and their level of activity in the rebellion at all. The feasibility theory thereby seems weak theoretically as well as empirically based on this paper's insights. Besides Collier's argument, Vinci's survival argument (2006); Murshed & Tadjeddin's social contract argument (2009); and a range of other arguments (e.g., Korf, 2005) provide explanations about rebels' motivation. These

some general insights can be made about how to intervene in a (pre)conflict situation. When the rebellion is driven by passion, political solutions are called for to try to manage the discourses at the injustice. However, when the rebellion is driven by reason, "a political solution may not end the violence" (Stewart, 2000: 23). Policy makers should then think in manipulating and changing the rational tradeoffs facing rebels both by changing the economic incentives and the mortality risks. Thus, one needs first to remove the incentives for people to fight and then afterwards address the background for the passions that triggered the war in the first place (Keen, 2010: 25; McCoy, 2008: 105). Liberia's relapse into war in 1999 might be this case in point (see Call, 2010). There is no doubt that a holistic approach is necessary for all intervention, however, the focus should be much different whether the purpose is to avoid a civil war or to end

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