

CFSP Watch 2004 Greece – by Nikos Frangakis, A.D.Papayannidis, Eleni Demiri and Evangelos Vlioras

1. Basic views of CFSP/EDDP

One might term it a constant factor of Greek political life, that CFSP/ESDP has a considerable importance. In a country that for almost two decades has a pro-EU public opinion and where the main political parties (with the exception of rigidly anti-EU Communist Party/KKE) are increasingly pro-European, CFSP mechanisms have come to be expected to solve or at least help in solving major problems of foreign policy. Thus, Greece is the only country where the debate about CFSP ranges to a demand for common borders. Such has been the official Greek negotiating position all the way from Maastricht to the adoption of the European Constitution.

Greece's case is typical of a middleweight country in a EU -25 with modest means that tries to walk the straight and narrow, promoting the Community method and declaring it considers the EU a security actor and not a debating society. CFSP/ESDP carries within it the potential of being an important policy instrument for the EU, on its own right and not just an icing on the cake of the EMU, provided that Europeans take the necessary measures to that effect.

Greece has called for more frequent common positions and deeper cooperation in the field of CFSP/ESDP and for the extension of the community method in these areas. Greece's vision for the future focuses heavily on the development of a CFSP/ESDP, especially through the inclusion of a mutual assistance clause in the Treaty of the Union.¹

¹ Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece's Strategic Objectives in the Convention on the Future of Europe, online article found in <http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign>

Further to the “usual” CFSP issues which arise from challenges on the global scene, Greece had in 2004 two sets of issues prioritized: one was more-or-less expected, the other came rather unexpectedly to the fore.

The first issue has to do with Greek-Turkish relations, especially under the angle of Turkey’s EU accession perspectives. Since Ankara was expecting from the December 2004 Summit the final (?) EU position concerning the start of its accession negotiations, the state of Greek-Turkish relations is deemed crucial at this stage. In fact, there have been renewed tensions at the Aegean – both in respect of disputed islets/ “grey zones” at sea and of airspace incursions. As a backdrop to this tension, one has to mention the unresolved Cyprus issue at the post-Annan Plan era. The Helsinki (1999 Summit) agreement, has tacitly lapsed whereby if no solution was found in Greek-Turkish disputes through bilateral negotiations, then contentious issues would be submitted to the ICJ. So Greece - the Government and Opposition, the elites, public opinion, the media- is uneasily

Were renewed tensions to surface, either in the FYROM or in Kosovo, especially insofar the Albanian minority/local majority issue is concerned, then CFSP would be sucked back into the Balkan arena, where it was hoped that the perspective of enlargement would be now the name of the game.

2. National perceptions

a) A Perceived Success/

The prevailing view in Greece seems to point towards taking steps to remedy the situation rather than abandoning the CFSP framework altogether. The new security agenda in the post 9/11 environment³ demands effectiveness, swiftness and coherence in foreign policy. The missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina/ Operation Althea, FYROM/ Operation Proxima and the Democratic Republic of Congo/ Operation Artemis although undoubtedly steps in the right direction, are taken to indicate that the CFSP/ESDP process is going through its childhood illness phase, faced with budgetary and other concerns.

b) Position towards NATO

It should be remembered that Greece welcomed the reaching of agreement on the Berlin-plus agenda, with an assumption of initial operational capability by the military leg of the ESDP⁴ at the end of the road. It is clear, however, that there will be times when the UN or NATO or OSCE will be unwilling or unable to intervene in crises unfolding in Europe's periphery. In the short to medium term, Greece thus views the development of ESDP as an indispensable policy instrument, even more so in the light of experiences acquired in IraR-0.0002 Tc 0.2624c 0.2644

Logistics Company/ turning down NATO requests for the dispatch of more sophisticated hardware such as Apache attack and Chinook transport helicopters.

As far as Iraq is concerned, Greece has offered to train members of the new Iraqi National Guard, although not on Iraqi soil, and is contributing funds to the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.⁵

c) EU crisis management

Greece has contributed to the military leg of ESDP a force of 4700 men, 46 aircraft and 13 warships. Greece participates in the European on-call police force with 180 police officers, 20 of which are assigned to the rapid deployment police force⁶. Greece is also taking part in the EU police mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM and the UN police mission in Kosovo with 33 police officers in total⁷. The EU's preventive diplomacy is considered to have a wide scope for extending its action on the basis of international legitimacy and UN Resolutions. The EU as the biggest donor of aid can further coordinate all its external actions to serve the aims of preserving and extending democratic practices, good governance and respect for Human Rights. Furthermore, the EU's greatest leverage in t

Mediterranean, based on common values and economic interests. Alongside the arduous process of negotiating and implementing conformity with the *acquis*, there is a wider political condition relating to respect of democratic values, minority protection and resolution of outstanding border disputes.

It is the prevailing view in Greece's academia that the parallel processes of EU and NATO enlargement, although conducive to increasing stability security and democracy, particularly in southeastern Europe¹¹, increase difficulties in decision-making and policy coordination. In this light, enlargement was not a matter of choice but one of necessity.

On the other hand, enlargement is heightening tensions in transatlantic relations, since it is becoming apparent that the EU and the United States have divergent world views and do not see eye to eye on issues of international importance such as Iran or the Middle East Peace Process.

The "old Europe/new Europe" dichotomy has been experienced in Greece mainly as a case of American interests – and – priorities gaining the upper hand in European affairs. "New" countries have (genuine or perceived) security concerns that need to be addressed. Many countries have joined (Finland, Greece) or are joining the EU for security-related as well as economic reasons¹². The EU should provide policy alternatives for new member-states and actually come up with common positions, which the new and aspiring member-states can adopt, before pointing an accusing finger to them for aligning with the US.

e) European Security Strategy

More than military capabilities, what Europe lacks today, is a clear security strategy, reflecting a collective approach to the European security interests. To

¹¹ Andreas Kintis, CFSP/ESDP: The atrophy of the non-military aspect of crisis management, ELIAMEP Yearbook 2002 (in Greek).

¹² Stelios Stavridis, "Militarising" the EU: The ETEMC /P43v

this end, the *Security Strategy of the Union*, presented by High Representative Javier Solana, at the Rome European Council meeting, last December, establishes a base for further consideration by the Member States, in order to reach a final conclusion, on when, where and with what means the EU should intervene in the international field. Strategic targets should be specified, responding to the new asymmetrical threats, such as the international terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction, which, in many cases, are directly connected with organized crime¹³.

Within the scope of the European Security Strategy it is the position of the Greek Government that it is of the utmost importance for the EU to draw up modalities and procedures for the specificities of applying enhanced cooperation among member states in the Defense field. Greece believes that the eventual creation of

the process of European integration. Greek representatives have endorsed in no uncertain terms the over-arching objective of strengthening and consolidating the CFSP/ESDP. Greece, appointed the foreign minister, at the time, G. Papandreou as representative to the Convention (replacing G. Katiforis), just after the beginning of the Greek Presidency in order to attain higher visibility for Greece's participation in the Convention. Papandreou put forward proposals for the direct election of the President of the Union as well as the fusion of the functions of the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations. Papandreou also promoted the reinforcement of the European and national Parliaments' control the EU'S external Action and the use of QMV in the area of CFSP¹⁶.

Greece was in favor of the other working group recommendations such as the creation of a European Diplomatic Service¹⁷, a European Diplomatic Academy and common representation in third countries and international organizations¹⁸. The Greek Government has also put on the table the idea of the creation of a European Coast Guard¹⁹ as well as the creation of a unified framework for the EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, and EUROCORPS initiatives within the ERDF framework²⁰. The Union's policy on immigration 58s 90031 Tumhe n 58s Tc 0.1284 T06212 0 0

Furthermore, Greece is a strong proponent of European Space Cooperation as another facet of ESDP²². The Greek Presidency of the Council tasked EUMC/EUMS with the formulation of a green paper outlining EU priorities and practical measures for the creation of a EU Space Policy with ESDP implications²³.

a) External representation

With regards to the institutional arrangements, Greece has declared itself, after considerable soul-searching, in favor of double hating. This is the case for the external representation of the Union, where Greece argued that the posts of the High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations should be merged²⁴.

Overall, the Greek Government was an advocate for the adoption of the Constitutional Draft Treaty put on the table by the Convention without significant alterations²⁵. Greece has been, from day one, a strong proponent of closer integration and would look favorably at a Constitution with greater Political Ambition that would endow the EU with policy instruments essential for bolder steps in the federal direction. However, since discretion is the better part of valor, Greece realizes that in the current political climate in Europe is not ripe for such an undertaking as the prevailing wind blows in the anti federal direction.

With regards to the presidency of the Council, it is the position of the Greek Government that with the notable exception of the Foreign Affairs Council, which should have a fixed Presidency, the Presidency of the Council should follow the rotation system on an equal basis among member states. Furthermore, Greece

²² Giannos Papantoniou, European Security and Defence Policy: The Greek Presidency address delivered at the conference on The Security and Defence dimensions of Space: Challenges for the EU, Athens, 08/05/2003

²³ Alexander Kolovos ESDP and Space: The Hellenic Presidency's initiatives in the Second Pillar, National Center for Space Applications (Athens, 8-9 May 2003), http://europa.eu.int/comm/space/doc_pdf/kolovos.pdf

²⁴ See EU Convention Watch - Greece, Istituto Affari Internazionali/TEPSA. p.2.

²⁵ EKEM Newsletter on the Future of Europe and the European Union (2003), No. 22, p. 2.

advocates the introduction of team presidencies made up of 3 member states and for one-year terms. The composition of the teams and the allocation of the different Council formations should be fixed in advance based on the principle of geographical and political equality among member states²⁶.

The previous socialist government had initiated a major policy shift from the traditional Greek tendency of alignment with pro-integrationist elements in previous IGCs, abandoning the front of smaller member states on the primordial question of the permanent/long term presidency and siding with the block of larger member states²⁷. This stance was reversed with the ascent to power of the New Democracy Party in 2004.

b) Decision-making

Greece is in favor of extending qualified majority voting in all areas, including CFSP with the exception of the military aspects of CFSP/ESDP²⁸. Still, this position, which finds constant public support (over 75% in successive Euro barometers), should always be seen in conjunction with an equally steady support for keeping the veto safety valve in place.

Greece put forward the proposal that five years after the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, decisions where the implementation of CFSP is concerned, will be taken by QMV. If, however, a member-state opposes the adoption of a decision by QMV, then the matter will be introduced in the Agenda of the next European Council where Unanimity would apply²⁹. Greece gave its support to the Italian Presidency compromise deal proposing that in the field of CFSP, acting on the proposal of the Foreign Minister, decisions could be adopted by QMV³⁰.

²⁶ EKEM Newsletter on the Future of Europe and the European Union (2003), No. 24, pp. 6-7.

²⁷ See EU Convention Watch - Greece, Istituto Affari Internazionali/TEPSA. p. 2.

²⁸ Ruby Gropa

c) Crisis management

In the field of crisis management, Greece has supported for many years, the updating of Petersberg Tasks to include tasks that require military resources³¹. The existing description of Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty covers a great range of missions, both quality and quantity wise. However the post 9/11 environment has shifted radically European threat perceptions and defense requirements. The Petersberg Tasks description should be amended to include new requirements such as conflict prevention, disarmament, dispatching of military advisors abroad to provide training as well as post-conflict stabilization and assisting government authorities in combating terrorism.

On the question of focus, Greece favors a more regional approach for the EU's crisis management focusing on the Union's periphery namely the Balkans, Southern Caucasus and the Mediterranean Basin. In 2003, the Greek government organized in the framework of the Greek presidency of the Council, a seminar on EU civilian crisis management and the Mediterranean with very encouraging results.

Greece attributes great strategic interest in Southern Caucasus as the region forms a natural corridor between Europe and Asia and shares in the EU's interest in the region, aiming to secure peace and stability in the region through the resolution of existing conflicts³².

d) Defense

Successive Greek Defense Ministers promoted the institutionalization of Council of Defense Ministers and of joint armaments planning and procurement. The insertion in the Treaties of an automatic solidarity clause in case of aggression,

³¹ Agence Europe, Kostas Simitis calls for Political Union and decentralized federalism and stresses importance of social cohesion, 04/02/2002.

³² Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece's

this discussion at present, but could give it much interest in future). Still, the central Greek position is that in order for a viable European Defense Industry to

interests. Greece is not opposed to forms of enhanced cooperation in matters of CFSP/ESDP given that they do not disrupt the unity or the coherence of the Union, as this variable geometry practice, is the only feasible way the new enlarged Union can maintain its positive momentum with regards to the deepening of integration. Otherwise, the EU runs the risk of coming to a grinding halt.

4. Activities in CFSP related research

Institutions:

Greek Centre of European Studies & Research (EKEME)

6, Kriezotou Street, GR-106 71 Athens

Tel.: + 30 210 362 68 88, + 30 1 360 73 20

Fax: + 30 210 363 16 31

Website: www.ekeme.gr , email: ekeme@info.gr

EKEME, headed by N. Frangakis and Prof. Arg. Fatouros, is the Greek member of TEPSA and as such has participated in the Enlargement-Watch and Convention-Watch. It hosted the TEPSA/EKEME Presidency Seminar on November 2002, which was largely centered on CSFP/ESDP matters.

University of Athens, Institute of European Integration and Policy (IEIP)

41-44, Aiolou Str, 105 60, Athens, suctm(ropean Integration and PoIBD/TT0 1 Tf5.612 sETEMC /P

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy-ELIAMEP

49, Vasilissis Sofias Ave., 106 76 Athens, Greece

Tel.: +30 210 7257110

Fax: +30 210 7257114

Website: www.eliamep.gr, email: eliamep@eliamep.gr

The Hellenic Institute for European and Policy/ELIAMEP, headed by Profs. Th. Couloumbis and Th. Veremis - an earlier Director General was Y. Valinakis, presently Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs - also deal with CSFP/ESDP matters, publishing a highly regarded Yearbook and occasional papers.

Hellenic Center for European Studies-EKEM

1, G Prassa and Didotou Street, 106 80 Athens, Greece

Tel.: + 30 210 36 36 880

Fax: + 30 210 36 31 133, website: www.ekem.gr

Associate Prof. K. Ifantis heads the Hellenic Centre for European Studies, which has organized a number of seminars on the Convention and has been publishing monthly Bulletins on this issue converting also CSFP/ESDP.

Panteion University, Institute of International Relations-IDIS

3-5 Hill Street, 105 58 Athens, Greece

Tel.: + 30 210 33 12 325/7

Fax: + 30 210 33 13 575,

Website: www.idis.gr, email: idis@idis.gr

President: Prof. D. Konstas

Defense Analysis Institute

17, Valtetsiou str., 106 80 Athens, Greece

Tel.: +30 (210) 3632971, +30 (210) 3632902

Fax: +30 210 36 32 634,

Website: www.iaa.gr, email: institut@otenet.gr

President: Evangelos Tsirkas, Lt. General (ret)

5. Some final remarks

Ever since its accession to the (then) European Communities in the late Seventies/ early Eighties, Greece has had the hope that the evolution of Europe towards an effective foreign policy, with an equally effective security/defense component would help in providing it with a “shield” in the troubled area of the Balkans/SEEurope, where its interests lay. Greece has been measuring the