

CFSP Forum

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Note from the Editor

Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

This issue of *CFSP Forum* returns to the subject of institutional reform, with an article on the

So who will speak for Europe? The constitutional treaty and coherence in EU external relations

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Students of EU external policy have much to speculate upon following agreement by the EU member states on a new constitutional treaty that they will sign this coming October. In the two years that it will probably take to get the treaty ratified by the current 25 member states there will be much discussion about how the new arrangements for the development and implementation of the EU's external policies will work in practice. If the treaty is ratified then the EU will be given a legal identity for the first time and the outside world will at least be spared the

Foreign Minister will also be responsible for organising the coordination of member state action in international organisations and at international conferences, In the UN Security Council, those EU member states who are either permanent or rotating members are required to request that the European Foreign Minister be asked to present the Union's position (assuming it has one!) on any issue under consideration by the Security Council. Over Iraq this would have presented a very interesting contribution to the debate about who speaks for Europe!

Although the identity of the first elected European Council President will remain unknown probably until 2009, we already know that Javier Solana will be the first European Foreign Minister. This summer he was reappointed for

seconded officials (not necessarily all diplomats given the growing role of 'home' civil servants in external policy-making and implementation) but how many of these and for how long remains to be decided. The task of shaping this EEAS along guidelines to be laid down by the Council will of course fall to the European Foreign Minister.

Away from Brussels, the Commission external delegations (there are currently over 120 making the Commission the fourth largest when compared with the member state diplomatic networks) will become Union delegations - though not yet embassies. The current Commission delegations are already doing a great deal more than overseeing EU

minister, diplomatic service, solidarity clause, defence capabilities agency, and enhanced cooperation all appeared regularly in debates on CFSP reform before the Iraqi crisis erupted. It is also not so clear how these specific reforms could help the EU avoid another embarrassing fallout like that over Iraq — with one exception. Institutions such as the common diplomatic service may be the best way to avoid splits on crises in future. The failure to agree on EU policy in general can reflect failure to agree on what is actually happening and what needs to be done; therefore, long-term cooperation within a diplomatic service could help to build such agreement in future crises.

One reform that neither the Convention nor the IGC could agree on has often been seen as the best way to overcome divisions within an enlarged EU: the extension of qualified majority

(including sanctions and use of force). But '[t]he best solution to the problem of proliferation of WMD is that countries should no longer feel they need them.' According to the security strategy, each threat requires a mixture of instruments - military means alone are ineffective, but must be combined with political, economic, legal, police, intelligence, judicial, and humanitarian means, and aid for economic reconstruction and development. The EU will use its instruments coercively, if need be, to counter the threats and address the root of the threats (such as bad governance). It will also act 'preventively' (not 'pre-emptively', which comes too close to the administration's strategy of emption): 'We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected. and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future.' Again, this approach has been seen before: the evolution of EU foreign policy cooperation is in a sense a history of efforts to create coherent, long-term policies based on the coordinated use of civilian and military policy instruments. The 2003 strategies do, however, set out the EU's approach more coherently and clearly, and do indicate that the EU will act more forcefully to counter threats.

The problem is still that in specific situations, consensus can break down precisely because the member states do not share a common assessment of what is going on and what needs to be done. It is not clear that a broad list of agreed but still rather vague objectives

and threats will help in partips(d do indi)10(caroac.17ateFc0.2842 Tw[(anul78.gue30-5.8do,reW n0919

third countries. This process is not complete, by any means – the member states can still find it difficult to reach and maintain agreement on whether to act and on how to act. But the CFSP, like the EU, is unlikely to be torn apart – the member states derive too much value from it. It is, in other words, business as usual. There also does not seem to be much evidence of a wholesale 'Americanisation' of EU foreign policy objectives, principles, or practice. In fact the events of the last year or so in Iraq have discredited the American approach in the eyes of many Europeans, but whether this will translate into a stronger and more influential EU approach is not clear.

A contradictory line on the Caucasus

William Wallace, Professor of International Relations, London School of Economics

Editor's note: This editorial comment first appeared in the *Financial Times* on 6 September 2004.

¹ This is an edited version of talks given at Brown and Columbia universities in February 2004, and as a keynote speech to a conference on international relations held at the Middle Eastern Technical University in May 2004.

Theorizing European Security Structures in an Age of Risk

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Over the course of the last three years, the debate on the future of ESDP has been consistent and intense, both within academia and the various national foreign ministries of EU member states as well as in Brussels. Javier Solana's European Security Strategy 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' was heralded as a breakthrough in the architecture of European security. The optimism it generated, however, was shattered as the façade of a common European foreign policy slowly crumbled against the forces generated around the Iraq crisis, leaving the academy to figure out what happened. While a variety of theories have been espoused - from neofunctionalism, to neorealism and intergovernmentalism - none seem to address the changing rationality of the postmodern world, a world defined by Christopher Coker in the words of Zygmut Bauman as 'liquid modernity'.

This period of post or liquid modernity is marked by the end of means-ends rationality as the only mode of operation that can be comprehended by social agents. Weber posited that humans determine action based upon expectations of the behaviour of other actors in their surroundings. Consequently, the expectations were held to be the 'means' for the calculated rationally executed ends of the actor. Weber disavowed the notion of individual action. Actors were considered alike, their reasons for acting universal and calculable; any diversity of action was due to differences in the means to achieve the end goal. Today, sociologists like Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck posit that rationality is no longer a case of simply being, but of becoming. Reflexive theory is based on the premise that 'actors monitor their own and other's behaviour, not as isolated acts but as shared understanding of how to make sense.'2 Means-ends rationality no longer determines the identity of the subjects. The effect of reflexive modernity on notions of security is that we live in international environment increasingly defined by 'risk'.3

Throughout modernity, risk has had a specific definition based on quantification and calculation. To this day, risk remains a facet of

the economic world. In modernity, the definition of risk involved the separation of risk and uncertainty. But in late-modernity this has changed. Risk and uncertainty have become partners in crime so to speak It is complicates uncertainty that identification, indeed makes risk calculation impossible. Furthermore, threat is based in the present. Threats are directed from one actor against another at a specific time, for a certain duration. Deterrence exists during the same time to prevent the threat from being enacted. Unlike specific threats, which are bounded by time and space, risks are not restricted by time or space. During the Cold War, it was not difficult to calculate the damage that one Soviet ICBM could cause to a Western city. It was less difficult to discern Soviet intentions through diplomatic notes, actions in international institutions, etc. In the post-September 11 world, it is exceedingly difficult to calculate the damage that a risk might eventually inflict. (The terrorist attack on September 11 illustrated this point: even Osama bin Laden was surprised at the result.) Thus, creating a common European foreign policy based upon the assumptions of the Cold War paradigm is bound to fail. Theorists need to keep this in mind and policy-makers need to be aware of what the risk society thesis means for European security architecture.

A substantial implication of the risk society thesis for Europe is the idea that the risk replaces the community now community. Christopher Coker writes that the risk community is predicated upon Benedict Anderson's notion of 'imagined communities' and draws upon Deutsch's conception of the security community.4 The community frame has been established to represent the closeness of perception, which hinges on the idea of being an imagined community, but one based upon certain shared values. This is because while an objective danger might exist, naming it a subjective risk requires a very common frame of perception. Since risk is about choice, a 'transnationa a nso5295TJ-11

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perception amongst community members. As Coker notes, it is the nature of the risk community that everything is contested. Even though such contestation might make the community seem like less of a community, a certain degree of divergence is inherent in the enterprise. This is also the case, however, in a threat based alliance (to some extent); threat relies more concrete evidence on quantification than risk, and thus is a different entity all together. Applying the risk community concept to Europe might explain current difficulties and help prescribe inventive policy options.

The changing rationality of security, the rise of risk and the development of the risk community thesis are all ideas that have begun to appear in the security studies literature. To date, very little of this material has been applied to Europe enlighten understandings of European security structures. While the risk society thesis cannot explain every nuance of the present situation, there is good reason to believe that it is applicable to the European case. Europe certainly represents, at least with regard to internal policies, a risk community. Perhaps one of the reasons Europeans fail to reach consensus on foreign policy issue is due to the nature of risk management in the risk community highlighted above.

¹ Max Weber, *Economy and Society: A Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, ed. Gunther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

² Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A New Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 140.

³ Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, 'Reflexive Security: Nato and International Risk Society,' *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30, 2 (2001); Gearóid Ó Tuathail, 'Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 22, no. 2/3 (1999).

⁴ Christopher Coker, *Globalization and Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century: Nato and the Management of Risk* (London: International Institute of Security Studies, 2002), pp. 70-71.

⁵ Ulrich Beck, *World Risk Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), p. 24.

⁶ Christopher Daase, 'Internationale Risikopolitik. Ein Forschungsprogramm für den sicherheitspolitischen Paradigmwechsel', in *Internationale Risikopolitik: Der Umgang mit neuen Gefahren in den Internationalen Beziehungen*, eds. Christopher Daase, Susanne Feske, and Ingo Peters (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002), p. 25.