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Note from the Editor

Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

Happy new year!

The focus of this issue of *CFSP Forum* is EU security and defence. One article analyses the new European Defence Agency, another the recently-launched Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two articles examine in more depth the significance and implications of recent developments in EU security policy. And the two final articles take a closer look at developments in two member states, Finland and Germany.

This year Commission funding for the FORNET network will end. We would appreciate hearing your views on FORNET in general, and on how FORNET might continue into the future without Commission funding. Are there other sources of funding for which we should apply? Which FORNET activities should we try to extend beyond the next year? Please contact us with your thoughts, at fornet@fornet.info.

The European Defence Agency: serious opportunity, daunting challenge

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and

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The Union's strategic awakening to crisis management has been signalled by a number of recent developments and the arguable lynchpin of that awakening is the European Defence Agency

the need to address these with the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention, requires

From a European security community to a secure European community[1]

Magnus Ekengren, Senior Lecturer, National Defence College, Sweden

Karl Deutsch defined 'security community' as a group of people that is integrated to the point that there is a 'real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other ways'.[2] The European security community has been explained as the result of the EU's desecuritisation of inter-state relations, defined by Buzan and Waever as the shifting of issues out of the emergency mode into the normal political processes.[3] Today the EU is securitising

function of national government and EU

to a new type of regional security identity. There is now a need for theories able to explain how

Europe has a strategy, but is the EU a strategic actor?

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More than a year after the US National Security Strategy (NSS) was published in September 2002, the EU presented its own European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003.[1] The ESS is a limited document which aims mainly to protect European security, rather than focus on European *and* global security. The ESS also illustrates that the EU is a strategic actor focused on short-term

A strategic actor focused on short term European security

To be a strategic actor, Europe needs aims, capabilities and policies with results. Security is a state of being secure, or feeling free from danger and destitution. For Europe to be secure, it must address the threats of terrorism and WMD. It could then promote a 'European security strategy'. All the other challenges such as making the world a better place are not directly aimed at enhancing European security. Answering these other challenges would mean that Europe has both a 'European *and* international security strategy', or a global strategy, as it would focus both on its own security and on the security of other countries in the world.

EU foreign policy is made up of the EU's trade, development, CFSP and ESDP policies. In the following sections, I will look at what action the EU is taking in these four policy fields to answer first, global challenges, and second, threats.

No coherent global strategy

When establishing trade relations with third parties, the EU adopts the strategy of exporting its values, as it tries to include a political conditionality clause, namely the respect of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and good governance (corruption must be eradicated). However, this is not systematic. For instance, 'China, South Korea, Laos, the Philippines, and Malaysia refused to have political conditionality included in their sectoral trade agreements with the EU.'[5] This leads to a European foreign policy which applies different conditions to different countries, which shows the limits of its export strategy.

The EU's development policy also exports EU values through the use of political conditionality. This policy is different from that of the US. In effect, Europe spends more on the developing world than the US does. Table 1 (p. 10) shows the differences between aid given by European states, the European Union, the US and the rest of the world.

The way the EU carries out its development policy is different from that of the US. The EU aims to transpose its own model of regional integration; it is willing to give more aid to countries which create regional blocs among themselves. However, despite the apparent effectiveness of the EU's development policy, one must keep in mind that the EU spends more on; it iU Thaan

Action on Combating Terrorism (11 June 2004) details this link: the Council and the Commission must 'include effective counter-terrorism clauses in all agreements with third countries' (point 1.4). The EU requires third countries to reaffirm the importance of the fight against terrorism and to co-operate in the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism. Some NGOs have expressed their concern about this paragraph. The counter-terrorism clause mentioned in agreements with third countries goes against the concept of development aid, which traditionally focuses on third states' concerns, namely the fight against poverty. The EU does not specify the consequences (for instance sanctions) for third countries that do not comply with this clause. [7]

In the CFSP field, EU action seems to have had a very limited impact. In terms of institutions to address the problems of WMD, the EU wants to strengthen the controls and relevance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to proliferation. It adopted the Declaration on the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the U.S.-EU Summit in June 2003. It has a Personal Representative appointed to deal with WMD matters since October 2003. In terms of CFSP policies, as regards proliferation, the ESS is concerned that 'distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand'. It states that there are possible 'nuclear risks' in North Korea, South Asia and the Middle East. But effectively, very few programmes to help these states have been set up. The Big Three within the EU have given special attention to Iran. However, the main sponsors of terrorism are Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Chechnya. The EU does not seem to be acting vis-à-vis these states.

In the ESDP field, the EU does not have the capacity to fight terrorism and countries with WMDs.

The EU is a strategic actor focused on short term European security. When European states have an aim, namely combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, they act in a unified way and with the whole range of capabilities available to them. In order to ensure both long term European security and global security, it would have to aim at materialising the rhetoric of promoting international security as stated in the ESS. ◊

Table 1[8]
Overseas Development Aid in 2003

Country	% GNI	$ million	% total aid by donors
Italy	0.17	2,433	
Greece	0.21	362	
Austria	0.20	505	
Spain	0.23	1,961	
Germany	0.28	6,784	
Portugal	0.22	320	
United Kingdom	0.34	6,282	
Finland	0.35	558	
France	0.41	7,253	
Ireland	0.39	504	
Belgium	0.60	1,853	
Luxemb.	0.81	194	
Netherlands	0.80	3,981	
Sweden	0.79	2,400	
Denmark	0.84	1,748	
EU States Total	0.35	37,139	54
Of which EC		7,173	10.5
United States	0.15	16,254	24
Japan	0.20	8,880	13
New Zealand	0.23	165	
Australia	0.25	1,219	
Canada	0.24	2,031	
Switzerland	0.39	1,299	
Norway	0.92	2,042	
Total other		6,756	9
TOTAL		69,029	100

[1] 'A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy', Brussels, 12 December 2003;
'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', September 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html.
[2] François Heisbourg, ed., 'European Security Strategy: Is it

In fact, Operation Althea makes up only one part of the Union's presence in the country. But through this operation, the EU can be expected to play many different roles at the same time, and lots of attention is drawn towards the operation from both outside and inside the Union. To start with three most obvious roles,

Finally, Operation Althea can also be seen as an occasion for a *retouche* on the roles of the different EU organs and on the balance of power between them. The European Parliament has shown an interest in an increased say in the military side of the EU's new crisis management

Finland: still in search of a mission statement

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It is difficult to think these days of any entity without some sort of a mission statement. As traditional organizations and hierarchies have given way to networks, everyone from individuals through NGO's and corporations to great powers has been encouraged to state their mission in simple and understandable words. Contemporary mission statements in international politics, such as the US National Security Strategy or the European Security Strategy, are brief documents that paint a picture of the values that the actors hold dear and the goals they seek to promote.[1] Networks of policy-makers, think-tankers, diplomats, officers and consultants are then tasked to rethink creatively every day how the mission statement can be turned into reality.

The keys to successful implementation of a mission statement in international politics these days are similar to the secrets of managing a large corporation: the winner is the culture that breeds innovativeness, rewards achievement, allows people to learn from mistakes and is in real-time touch with the rest of the world. Losers in contemporary international politics are made from the same mould as failed businesses: rigid hierarchies and standard operating procedures, and organisational cultures that stifle discussion and reward subservience.

In search of that vision thing

In Finland, the latter half of 2004 saw a period of unprecedented debate over a mission statement for the county's foreign and security policy. The debate crossed the usual political divisions, with the government coalition's credibility stretched to its limits as the main politicians seemed to disagree with each other on fundamental issues.[2] In the debate, the prime minister, for example, took a positive approach to globalisation as well as the development of the European Union's military capabilities, whereas the president aligned herself with anti-globalisation forces and was reserved about the idea of the EU's battle groups acting without a UN Security Council mandate. In addition, the governing parties were internally divided on issues such as whether or not to call Finland a militarily non-aligned country.

The debate had its origins in the government's much-awaited Security and Defence Policy Report, which was published in September 2004.[3] For several years, the political e 63.7bE7u96 TDt44.8 5Unn

[1] A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels: December 2003; The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, Washington: September 2002.
[2] The main parties in the government currently are the Center Party, torn between its more liberal wing and the less liberal rural-agricultural lobby; and the Social Democrat Party, in which business-friendly federalists and more traditional socialists struggle for power. In the making of foreign policy, the Centre Party's key posts are the Prime Minister, the Defense Minister, and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development, while the SDP' key posts are the President and the Foreign Minister.
[3] The report is available at http://www.defmin.fi/chapter_images/2160_English_White_paper_2004.pdf

Germany: the new deployment law and the problem of integrated military structures

preserve a distinct feature of German postwar constitutionalism by giving the parliament a powerful role in defence politics.

The problem of integrated military structures

The 'Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz' was brought back on the agenda as concerns mounted that a strong parliament might conflict with renewed efforts to establish integrated military structures. Germany has been a staunch supporter of integrated military structures as they were regarded as welcome safeguards against a re-nationalisation of defence policies after the cold war. Together with France, Germany was instrumental in establishing the Eurocorps in 1991. More recently, the German government welcomed the establishment of a NATO Response Force as well as of EU battle groups. Both are highly qualified forces designed for the most demanding tasks out of area. Most importantly, both the NATO Response Force and the EU battle groups are designed to be deployable on very short notice. At the Military Capabilities Commitment Conference in November 2004, the defence ministers announced their ambition 'to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council.'[1] No later than ten days after such a decision, the forces should start implementing their mission on the ground. NATO has similar ambitions regarding the deployability of its Response Force.

From a military point of view, rapid deployability is essential for addressing certain types of crises. The requirement of rapid deployment, however, may come into conflict with the necessity of parliamentary approval. This became obvious when NATO organized a simulation of deploying its Response Force in Colorado Springs in October 2003. It soon became clear that a rapid deployment could be endangered by the required advance approval of the German Parliament. As with AWACS, German troops would play an essential role for the NRF. In contrast to AWACS, however, even a belated 'green light' could possibly cause

Recently-published and forthcoming books and articles on European foreign policy

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Thomas Christiansen and Ben Tonra, eds, *Rethinking EU Foreign Policy*, Manchester University Press, 2004.

Wolfram Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert, eds, *European Union Enlargement: A Comparative History*, Routledge 2004