



CFSP Forum

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Note from the Editor

Karen E. Smith, London School of Economics, Editor

This issue of *CFSP Forum* continues a major theme of the last issue, and contains several more articles on EU crisis management. Given the increasing number of ESDP missions, this theme will undoubtedly carry forward into future *Forum* issues as well!

It opens with an article by Benjamin Kienzle assessing the EU's strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Then two articles consider the EU's missions in Macedonia (Isabelle Ioannides) and Rafah (Maria A. Sabiote), and the final article analyses the EU's role in Afghanistan. All of the authors are also young scholars – proof again of the extensive and growing academic interest in the field of European foreign, security and defence policies.

The EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMDs: An Interim Assessment

Benjamin Kienzle, Associate Researcher at the Observatory of European Foreign Policy, Institut Universitari d'Estudis Europeus, Barcelona, Spain¹

The development of an EU policy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) made a quantum leap in 2003, when the Brussels European Council adopted in December a fully-fledged *EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD*. The Strategy was the first comprehensive and integrated EU document addressing all aspects of non-proliferation. Moreover, at a time when it was deeply divided over the way to deal with the alleged Iraqi WMD programme and the subsequent American-led invasion of Iraq, the EU demonstrated that it was able to reach a consensus – exceeding the common minimum denominator – on a highly sensitive issue.

The way to the EU Strategy, however, has been long and difficult. During the first 20 years of the existence of the European Community, WMD issues were to a large extent not seen as 'European' issues. It was only in the 1980s and, above all, the 1990s that the EU became gradually more involved in non-proliferation affairs, for example through the regulation of dual-use items export controls.² In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the turmoil surrounding the Iraq war, the EU intended for the first time to form a more comprehensive and coherent non-proliferation policy. Eventually, the EU crossed the Rubicon in non-proliferation affairs with the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Strategy.

The EU Non-Proliferation Strategy

competence problems between the Commission, the Council and the member states.⁶ An additional problem is the absence of a clear EU budget line for non-proliferation, both in the Community and in the CFSP budgets. It is actually very difficult to calculate how much money the EU spends on non-proliferation.⁷ In general, financial resources for non-proliferation activities have been rather limited.

Finally, it must be pointed out that even if the EU had solved all its internal problems, its non-proliferation policy would still depend on certain exogenous factors. For example, the activities of other major powers, above all of the United States, can either significantly improve or, more importantly, impair the effectiveness of the EU's non-proliferation efforts. In other cases, the issue of WMD proliferation is subordinated to more general problems, for instance in the Middle East, where non-proliferation efforts by any outside actor have only very limited prospects for success as long as the Middle East conflict as such is not solved first.

In conclusion, the EU as an effective actor in non-proliferation affairs depends on many varied and often uncontrollable factors. The danger is, therefore, that the EU may ultimately not be able to fulfill the expectations created by the Non-Proliferation Strategy, both inside and outside the Union. In other words, the overall result may be a classic 'capability-expectations gap.' Nevertheless, the Strategy is a comprehensive and coherent document that forms a good basis to advance in the area of WMD non-proliferation and it must be pointed out that the EU has already taken a few concrete steps in the right direction, particularly in the field of effective multilateralism.

¹ The article is partly based on a paper presented at the CHALLENGE Training School in Brussels on 22 April 2006. The author would like to acknowledge the support of a scholarship of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Beca MAE-AECI*).

² For a comprehensive overview of European non-proliferation activities from its early days until the 1990s, see Clara Portela (undated): *The Role of the EU in the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Way to Thessaloniki and Beyond*,

EU Police Efforts in Macedonia: 'Learning-by- Doing?'

Tackling Short-term Security Concerns

On the Council side, an EU Police Mission code-named *Proxima* was deployed in December 2003 (initially for a year, then renewed for a second one), taking over from the first EU military mission *Concordia*. EUPOL *Proxima* was the second police mission falling under ESDP, but unlike the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM), it was the first one to develop from a concept to a fully operational mission. To ensure that the mission responded to the particular needs in Macedonia, the deployment of *Proxima* was preceded by a joint European Commission-Council Secretariat fact-finding mission. In an effort to learn from past missions and liaise with existing actors on the ground, the mission incorporated officers from the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina, informally consulted with *Concordia*, and sought the advice of the OSCE and bilateral actors.

The short two-month planning period however, did not allow the development of a well-defined mission statement. *Proxima's* broad mandate covered assistance to consolidate law and order, including the fight against organised crime; support for the implementation of the reform of the MoI, police and a border police; confidence-building with local populations; and improving co-operation with neighbouring countries.⁷ In practice, *Proxima* police officers were co-located with indigenous police officers in regional and local police stations in the former crisis areas, the MoI in Skopje and at border crossings to offer operational mentoring, monitoring and advice on the strategic changes promoted by the Commission. In line with *Proxima's* mandate to work 'within a broader rule of law perspective', Law Enforcement Monitors helped advance co-operation among all bodies in the criminal justice system (the police, Public Prosecutor's Office, investigative officers, and courts).⁸ *Proxima*

adopted when the mission was deployed.

Working in a Multilateral Environment

As is commonplace in peace support operations, the EU presence in Macedonia exists alongside other international organisations and bilateral actors. The main international actors include the US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP), which provided the initial training of minority police cadets, helped establish the Police Professional Standards Unit in the MoI and is currently involved in community policing training. The OSCE carried out the bulk of the work on police monitoring prior to the 2001 conflict, and following the signature of the Framework Agreement created a Police Reform Unit (in consultation with the Council Secretariat). The OSCE took over the cadet training from ICITAP, developed the training curricula for the Police Academy, and since the redeployment of the police to the crisis areas in 2002, has been involved in community policing training. Some EU member states also participate in police efforts in Macedonia on a bilateral basis, albeit on a limited budget and at an operational level, in parallel with EU-level involvement. France has concentrated on providing training for the Special Forces units in the MoI; the UK has concentrated on the organised crime units and, along with the Netherlands, is involved in community policing.¹⁴

Proxima's mandate and the CARDS JHA Strategy emphasise the importance of co-ordinating their efforts with other international actors. To ensure overall political co-ordination within the international community, regular meetings, chaired by the EUSR, bring together the heads of the main international actors in Macedonia (the so-called 'Principals').¹⁵ Furthermore, the 'Police Experts Group', consisting of all international actors involved in Macedonia's police reform convened on a weekly basis, under the chairmanship of the EUSR's Police Advisor, and aimed to ensure coherence in police efforts. In order to promote a broader rule of law approach, international actors supporting the judicial and the penal system were also associated with this group. Participants in this group agree that the forum was inefficient in co-ordinating efforts, because of the formality of the event which led actors to defend their mandate. The absence of exchange of information on ongoing efforts led to the duplication of programmes and a waste of time and resources. The tension was particularly visible between *Proxima*-OSCE exchanges on community policing and the OSCE-EC

relationship regarding police reform.¹⁶ The post of Police Advisor was not renewed beyond July 2004 and co-ordination of international police efforts was instead moved to the EC Delegation. This perhaps points to the Council's tacit acceptance that police reform is a long-term process and thus must be led by the Commission. The usual recruitment difficulties however meant that a JHA expert has only recently joined the EC Delegation. Interestingly enough, informal contacts and bilateral meetings, which took place in the meantime, were more helpful in building trust between the different actors.¹⁷

Conclusion

Important lessons can be drawn from *Proxima* for future ESDP police operations: handing over missions (from *Concordia* to *Proxima*); planning and setting up a mission; carrying out joint Commission-Council Secretariat fact-finding missions; using benchmarking for evaluating performance and progress. *Proxima* has also pointed to the benefits of ESDP civilian operations as opposed to Commission projects: EU police advisers are in the field, alongside local police and have a real sense of the situation; Council missions are set up faster than Commission programmes; and it is easier for the Council to find the necessary capabilities, although the increasing threat of terrorism in Europe will undoubtedly affect the Council's ability for police force generation.

The 'dual track' model however has revealed serious unresolved problems when it comes to EU inter-institutional and wider multilateral co-ordination of police efforts. The 'turf wars' that were fought between the EUSR and the EC Delegation generated some confusion in the eyes of the Macedonian authorities as to who was in charge.¹⁸ This perE Es il a86Tc()Tj-25.012 -1.2096 T-00

which would help create a clear division of labour between the Commission and the Council Secretariat in Brussels and on the ground, is imperative for a functioning EU 'dual track' approach.

¹ Some of the findings summarised in this article are presented in Isabelle Ioannides, 'EU Police Mission *Proxima*: Testing the "European" Approach to Building Peace', in A. Nowak (ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: The EU Way*, Chaillot Paper No. 90 (Paris: European Institute for Security Studies, June 2006), pp. 69-86.

² An EU Special Representative (EUSR) was appointed to help ensure, *inter alia*, 'the coherence of the EU external action' and 'co-ordination of the international community's efforts'. Council Joint Action 2002/963/CFSP, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 334, 11 December 2002, pp. 7-8.

³ See *Rapid Reaction Mechanism End of Programme Report Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia* (Brussels: European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, European Commission, November 2003).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Evaluation of the Implementation of Council Regulation 2667/2000 on the European Agency for Reconstruction*,

presence at the Rafah crossing point in order to contribute, in cooperation with the Community's institutional-building efforts, to the opening of the Rafah crossing point and to build up confidence between the Government of Israel

¹² Pedro Serrano, op.cit., p. 43.

¹³ Nicoletta Pirozzi, 'Building Security in the Palestinian Territories', *European Security Review*, no. 28, February 2006, p. 5.

¹⁴ Muriel Asseburg, 'From Declarations to Implementation? The Three Dimensions of European Policy towards the Conflict', in Martin Ortega, ed., 'The European Union and the Crisis in the Middle East', *Chaillot Paper*, no. 62, July 2003, pp. 11-26.

¹⁵ Other contributions have been done in terms of equipment (Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden and United Kingdom) and financial contributions (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Malta and The Netherlands).

¹⁶ An incident of grave concern took place on 3 January 2006 when some Palestinian members of the Al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade attacked the Rafah crossing point and provoked the evacuation of the EU team and the death of two Egyptian soldiers.

The EU in Afghanistan: What Role for EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Policies?

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Although the EU has employed political and economic instruments in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, the provision of security rests in the hands of NATO and individual EU member states. This is puzzling for two reasons: first, the EU is in possession of civilian and military crisis management instruments under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which could be employed in Afghanistan. Second, a number of key threats identified in the 2003 European Security Strategy – terrorism, state failure and organized crime – are present in Afghanistan, which should in principle raise expectations for the EU (rather than its individual member states) to play a role in the provision of security. This article suggests that EU policies adopted in Afghanistan highlight a substantial tension, present at the creation of the policies towards the country in 2001/02: that of individual EU member state preferences and attitudes over the role and

individual EU member states – Britain, France and Germany at the forefront – sought to contribute to the US-led war on terror through Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in order to demonstrate their solidarity with the US as well as to increase their international standing.² This provoked resentment and charges of compromising EU unity, and of engaging in what may be termed mini-lateralism: discussing military contributions in closed meetings, often ahead of EU summits, thereby sidelining smaller EU member states including Belgium, which held the EU presidency during the second half of 2001. While this does not mean that the EU was not considered an important political and economic actor in Afghanistan on the part of EU member states, the initial appearance at least gave testimony to fragmentation rather than EU unity – and the reactions to suggestions of a possible ‘EU force’ as part of ISAF starkly illustrated the divergent views on the part of EU member states on the EU CFPS/ESDP’s global and military reach and ambitions. ISAF came under overall NATO command in 2003, signalling the alliance’s need to reinvent itself at the same time as the EU ESDP was in the process of inventing itself.³

such as the Kabul-Jalalabad-Torkham road project in cooperation with Sweden, the electricity rehabilitation of Kabul with Germany, and the co-financing of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) operations with Finland and Sweden using the Rapid Reaction Mechanism.¹⁰

Individual member states have taken the lead in certain issue areas in addition to their activities as part of ISAF: the UK is the lead nation on Afghanistan's counter-narcotic programme which includes border and police training and the promotion of sustainable, alternative livelihoods. Germany, on the other hand, has taken the lead in providing assistance for rebuilding the police force in Afghanistan, and is co-operating with the UK as some tasks overlap.¹¹ Since September 2004, France has been coordinating international efforts in support of the establishment of the Afghan Parliament, working closely with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and European partners,¹² whereas Italy has taken the lead in the justice sector.

There is, then, a significant degree of cooperation between the Commission and member states as well as bi-lateral cooperation in member states' specific fields of expertise in Afghanistan and within the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).¹³ But, this is limited to ad-hoc cooperation in functional matters. This also applies to Brussels, where the sharing of information and coordination in security matters is lacking, which reinforces the overall fragmentation of European efforts. As a result, visibility of EU commitments is low even if local perceptions of the EU are largely favourable.

Conclusion: Where to for the EU in Afghanistan?

Although the sum of European contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan – including policies adopted under the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), by the Commission and the individual member states – is impressive, it obscures the fact that coordination between the different actors is not a given and that the security situation in Afghanistan negatively affects these policies' impact. Insufficient coordination with and limited influence on NATO and US policies means that EU efforts are subject not only to external forces as they relate to conditions on the ground but also to the policies of other international security actors that impact on

Afghanistan's security. The fragmented nature of the presence of the different European actors in turn suggests that the overall impact of the EU, including its visibility as a foreign policy actor in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, is sub-optimal.

NATO remains a more central security actor in Afghanistan, and the systemic shock of September 11 has reinforced old truths: in competition with other security actors, and given the type of security situation faced, the EU was relegated to the role of a 'soft' security actor by the member states. At the same time, Afghanistan represents a potential theatre for increasing the scope and number of ESDP missions in the area of police and/or rule of law missions.¹⁴ But, despite extensive bi-lateral cooperation on the ground on the parts of individual EU member states, there seems to be little appetite for a coordinated EU effort for providing stability and security. This is due in large part to a lack of political will on the part of the member states to equip the EU with such a role in Afghanistan, which is rooted in part in concerns over the delineation of tasks between NATO and the EU. The initial decisions – not to coordinate EU actions under ISAF but instead to defer to US and member states on the use of ESDP instruments – seems, therefore, to have resulted in permanent structures as far as the scope of action for the EU CFSP/ESDP is concerned.

¹ Anatol Lieven, 'The End of NATO', *Prospect*, December 2001.

² Christopher Hill, *EU Foreign Policy since 11 September 2001: Renationalising or Regrouping?* First annual guest lecture in the 'Europe in the World' Centre series, University of Liverpool (www.liv.ac.uk/ewc). 24 October 2002.

³ Correspondingly, the invocation of Article V as a response to the attacks of 11 September has been interpreted as 'a response to NATO's self-preservation challenge'. Asle Toje, 'The First Casualty in the War against Terror: The Fall of NATO and Europe's Reluctant Coming of Age', *European Security*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2003, pp. 63-76.

⁴ Interview with member state officials, June/July 2005

⁵ Klaus Klaiber, 'The European Union in Afghanistan: Impressions of my term as Special Representative', National Europe Centre Paper No. 44, Australian National University, 2002. <http://www.anu.edu.au/NEC/klaiber.pdf>.

⁶ See Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2006/124/CFSP of 20 February 2006 extending the mandate of the Special Representative of the European Union for Afghanistan.

⁷ European Commission. Country Strategy Paper (CSP) Afghanistan, 2003-2006. Adopted 11 February 2003. http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/afghanistan/csp/03_06.pdf

⁸ International Crisis Group, *Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union's Role*, Asia Report No. 107, 30 November 2005.

⁹ European Commission, National Indicative Programme of European Community Support 2005-2006: Afghanistan.

¹⁰ European Commission, Rapid Reaction Mechanism End of Program Report Afghanistan. European Commission Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit, December, 2003.

¹¹ Federal Foreign Office/Federal Ministry of the Interior. *Assistance for rebuilding the police force in Afghanistan*. www.auswaertiges-amt.de, 2005.

¹² French Foreign Ministry, 2006.

¹³ There are currently 22 PRTs operating in Afghanistan, of which seven are led by EU member states. See ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams, 15 February 2006. http://www.afnorth.nato.int/ISAF/Backgrounders/bg005_prt.htm

¹⁴ And, although some member states have been looking to Afghanistan as a potential theatre for an ESDP operation, this has to date not resulted in specific policy proposals. Interview with member state official, June 2005.

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