ࡱ>  ibjbj 1{%B@^D   8VD<>("   >>@>@>@>@>@>@>$?iBd> 3"33d>  y>#;#;#;3   >>#;3>>#;#;=T= ,OO9L=*>>0>=,C9C=C =@zw&#;+.d>d>:j>3333C :  Thinking Outside the Box: The EU as a Foreign Policy System CHRISTIAN KAUFHOLZ Ӱ̳ European Foreign Policy Conference July 2 & 3, 2004 Contact: Christian Kaufholz MSc Politics of the World Economy (2003/04) London School of Economics and Political Science Ӱ̳ Bankside House 24 Sumner Street London, SE1 9JA United Kingdom +44 (0)78 0064 8630  HYPERLINK "mailto:c.kaufholz@lse.ac.uk" c.kaufholz@lse.ac.uk Introduction The European Union (EU) is a strange animal. Its unique governance structure defies conventional notions of national sovereignty and international regimes, drawing scholars attention to the question of how its components shape the whole, and vice versa. Studying the EUs foreign policy dimension is particularly challenging since it means adding an additional layer of external factors to an already convoluted set of internal ones. Whatever the result, we can expect EU foreign policy to defy conventional notions of foreign policy. At least in its economic dimension, the Union has in many respects assumed the appearance of a single (i.e. quasi-national) economic unit (though there is little agreement on how and why it got there). In contrast, the foreign policy dimension looks messy. With the Maastricht Treaty, member states launched the ambitious project of building a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Where is this CFSP? Why is the EUs foreign policy (still) so fragmented? In order to begin to understand why the EU acts the way it acts, it is essential to appreciate the intricate relationship between its governing structure and its foreign policy behavior. The key question thus becomes: How does an international system with specific characteristics (the EU) interact with the wider international system? To tackle this question, it is useful to analyze the EU as what I will call a Foreign Policy System (FPS). The term Foreign Policy System is intended to capture the idea that while EU foreign policy-making emanates from various centers (the EU level and national capitals), EU foreign policy can still follow a systemic logic. What may look like a foreign policy chaos reflecting the sacrifice of a collective (European) policy in favor of divergent national interests and national sovereignty considerations may in fact be a foreign policy system that can work effectively and benefit both individual member states and the EU as a whole. These benefits (defined in terms of foreign policy effectiveness) would be eliminated by centralizing foreign policy-making through the realization of a CFSP. This paper attempts to show that this loss of effectiveness can by itself explain the non-emergence of a CFPS. In fact, I argue that it may be precisely the EU framework that gives single member states and EU institutions the freedom and incentive to differentiate their foreign policies, which in turn benefit the Union. To make an intuitive analogy, one might want to think of a FPS as a foreign policy market in which actors, similarly to those in a free market economy, have incentives to specialize and exploit comparative advantages that end up increasing both individual and collective utility. In a FPS, these comparative advantages of member states and EU institutions are strongly conditioned by the EUs external environment, i.e. the political constellations in its periphery and beyond. This paper finds that the EUs geo-political environment has so far created strong demands for the persistence of a FPS, making a CFSP at most a second-best option. The paper is divided into two parts. Part I will outline the components of a FPS, introducing its three foreign policy dimensions. Part II will attempt to show how a FPS can conduct foreign policy in ways that are beyond the capacity of conventional foreign policy actors (i.e nation states) by discussing (1) the role of a FPS in EU enlargement, (2) the FPSs ability to encourage the exploitation of comparative foreign policy advantages, and (3) the geo-political implications of a FPS. The conclusion will summarize my findings and touch on some of the new questions raised by this approach to studying EU foreign policy. I. The EU as a Foreign Policy System What distinguishes a foreign policy system (FPS) from a conventional foreign policy actor (FPA) is its governance structure. While a FPS disposes of multiple, decentralized policy-making centers, a FPA channels policy-making primarily through one dominant policy-making center (the national government). The EU is a FPS where foreign policy-making is fragmented along two dimensions, the vertical (national vs. European levels) and the horizontal (among member states). The difference in governance structure between a FPS and a FPA has profound implications for foreign policy behavior. In fact, the complex governance structure of a FPS redefines the very meaning of foreign policy. More specifically, a FPS may involve three distinct dimensions of foreign policy the internal, the gravitational, and the external.  SHAPE \* MERGEFORMAT  Internal Dimension First, as an international system in its own right, a FPS by definition contains an internal foreign policy dimension since member states retain a high degree of foreign policy autonomy and thus also relate to each other as somewhat independent actors. This national foreign policy autonomy, however, has to be qualified when we look at intra-European relations. As European integration has progressed, traditional notions of foreign policy between member states have eroded in the sense that states no longer relate to each other in terms of separate security, let alone economic, spheres with clearly defined borders. The creation of supranational bodies, deep economic integration, and the complete demilitarization of intra-European relations blur the lines between foreign and quasi-domestic policies. At the heart of this ambiguity lies the question of the EUs constitutional nature. At what point, if ever, will the EU pass from an international system, i.e. from a FPS, to a confederacy or a federal state? In any case, as long as member states retain a high degree of foreign policy autonomy and the constitutional debate continues, the EU is likely to remain a FPS with a strong internal foreign policy dimension. Gravitational Dimension Second, a FPS may contain a gravitational foreign policy dimension, defining relations with its periphery. The principal vehicle for this gravitational foreign policy is enlargement i.e. the actual or potential offer of membership to outsiders. Gravitational influence changes neighbors domestic and foreign policies to meet accession requirements. It can infiltrate all imaginable policy areas, from technical standardization (e.g. product specifications) and legal harmonization (e.g. anti-trust law), over macro-economic stabilization (e.g. deficit and inflation ceilings) and border security provisions (e.g. anti-drug trafficking), to human rights policies (e.g. abolition of the death penalty) and constitutional changes (e.g. judicial independence or minority rights). To be sure, powerful FPAs, too, are capable of exerting influence on others in these policy areas. However, a (successful) FPS dangling the carrot of membership enjoys much more extensive power in transforming entire countries, particularly in their legal and constitutional make-up. Naturally, gravitational foreign policy ultimately has geographical and political limits and therefore constitutes a temporary instrument available to a FPS. External Dimension Finally, a FPS possesses an external foreign policy dimension, i.e. towards the wider international system. While the internal and gravitational dimensions clearly set apart a FPS from a FPA, the notion of external foreign policy requires a closer look when comparing a FPS to a FPA. When EU member states act as a bloc either by pursuing identical policies (intergovernmental consensus) or by delegating policy-making to the European level (supranational delegation) the FPS then assumes the characteristics of a FPA, i.e. of a nation state. However, this remains an option. A FPS is not required to act as a bloc to pursue external foreign policy. Member states may, for example, pursue distinct national foreign policies towards a third country. In this case, the FPS still pursues an external foreign policy towards the given third country though it fails to assume actor characteristics. In short, a FPSs external foreign policy dimension can be subdivided into two variations: a fragmented external foreign policy dimension and a unified external foreign policy dimension (see chart). While only one of three types of foreign policy, external foreign policy is often treated as the only dimension of EU foreign policy. This is not surprising given that external foreign policy is the kind of foreign policy associated with the traditional nation state in international relations. It constitutes what one usually mean by foreign policy. In consequence, comparisons between the EU and the US, for example, are made in reference to external foreign policy, assuming that the EU is a FPA, as opposed to a FPS. Moreover, CFSP clearly aims at endowing the EU with a unified external policy dimension. In the remainder of the paper, I will attempt to show, however, that the three dimensions of a FPS interact with and condition each other. It is only with reference to the EUs internal and gravitational foreign policy dimensions that we can explain the Unions external foreign policy behavior. This approach will provide new insights into why the EUs CFSP project has unfolded the way it has and where it is likely to go in the future. II. The EU: A Foreign Policy Actor in the Making? Why does the EU (still) lack a true CFSP, that is a centralized, Brusselized foreign policy? To use the terminology of this paper, why has the EU not transformed itself from a FPS to a FPA? In this section I will argue that, for both individual member states and the EU as a whole, the costs of centralizing foreign policy-making have so far outweighed the benefits. In fact, a CFSP is likely to undermine the very effectiveness of EU foreign policy arising from the current interplay of the internal, gravitational, and external foreign policy dimensions. This approach departs from previous analyses of EU foreign policy behavior by focusing on systemic external explanations about the trajectory of CFSP. It thereby questions a number of assumptions, namely that a CFSP is by definition in the collective interest of the EU; that the slow or non-emergence of CFSP is due to EU-internal obstacles to policy harmonization, such as national sovereignty considerations and divergent foreign policy interests of member states; and finally, that the lack of a CFSP reveals the limits of European integration. Instead, this paper argues that, for the EU, a FPS has been an effective arrangement to meet its collective foreign policy objectives; that CFSP cannot be seen as an end in itself; that member states often depend on each others divergent foreign policies; and, finally, that this policy variation may be a manifestation of, rather than evidence against, a high degree of European integration. The loss of foreign policy effectiveness associated with moving from a FPS to a FPA (by means of a CFSP) is primarily due to two factors. First, such a shift would undermine EU enlargement and thereby eliminate the benefits of the EUs gravitational policy dimension. Second, it would eliminate the possibility of instrumentalizing the comparative advantages of national foreign policy-making centers. Taken together, these changes would do away with the geo-strategic strengths the EU possesses as a FPS among FPAs. FPS and EU Enlargement EC/EU expansion to include new members has been a primary foreign policy instrument and goal since the beginnings of post-War European integration (gravitational dimension). Apart from the economic benefits of a growing regional market, the inclusion of new members has had profound political and security implications for Europe. For example, the integration of Spain has played a key role in promoting and consolidating Spains democratization; British membership has meant that the United Kingdom and France, Europes principal military (and only nuclear) powers, have embarked on a common path towards deepening European economic and political integration; the accession of Finland, Sweden, and Austria have shifted the EUs identity towards a more neutral, post-Cold War regional bloc; finally, the latest enlargement round has locked in a new pan-European, post-Cold War landscape by including eight former Warsaw Pact members. The foreign policy benefits of the enlargement strategy have been evident. In the 1990s, the EUs gravitational influence on Eastern Europe has arguably been the Unions most significant and successful foreign policy achievement. Successful gravitational foreign policy, however, depends on the existence of a FPS, particularly on a strong internal foreign policy dimension. This is so because membership is only attractive to outsiders as long as existing member states enjoy some degree of foreign policy autonomy towards each other. Outsiders will only be interested in joining an international system in which, once they are insiders, they can themselves participate in further integration efforts as equal players. In other words, there is a limit to how far political integration among existing members can proceed without diminishing the attractiveness to outsiders of joining the system. Clearly, if the EU was a unified economic, political, and security actor (i.e. a nation state), Bulgaria would have as little political interest in joining the EU as Honduras has in joining the United States! The construction of a CFSP is a major internal foreign policy project by EU member states and is inextricably linked to the EUs constitutional finalit. As such, the relationship between CFSP (unified external dimension) and enlargement (gravitational dimension) represents a direct trade-off; the completion of the enlargement process is thus likely to be a prerequisite for the emergence of a unified external foreign policy. The relationship between CFSP and enlargement represents a trade-off not only because CFSP undermines the EUs internal foreign policy dimension, but also because it eliminates (by definition) the possibility of fragmented external foreign policy. This is so because individual EU member states often enjoy special bilateral ties with (potential) accession states, usually their neighbors. For example, Finlands special relationship with the Baltic countries, Germanys close ties to Poland, Austrias links to Hungary, and Greeces relationship to the Balkan countries have endowed (or continue to endow) the EU with an open eastern border conducive to enlargement. Although enlargement is ultimately a Brusselized process, the bilateral ties linking the EU to its periphery have been crucial in the dynamics of enlargement, given bilateral historical, economic, or security motives for advancing EU accession of neighboring states. A FPS thus allows for the exploitation of national comparative advantages in foreign policy-making, a concept discussed in more detail in the next section. Suffice it to say that the success of EU enlargement has depended (and continues to depend) on both the internal and the fragmented external policy dimensions of a FPS, i.e. on instruments that CFSP would undermine or eliminate altogether. FPS and Comparative Advantages in EU Foreign Policy The second consequence of realizing a CFSP relates to the question of comparative advantage. Centralizing foreign policy-making at the European level follows the assumption that Brussels enjoys an inherent advantage in foreign policy-making and should therefore become the sole policy-making center. However, shifting from a fragmented to a united external foreign policy means foregoing policy-making flexibility in two respects. On the one hand, it means eliminating the possibility of distributing foreign policy-making among individual member states that can pursue distinct, even opposite, policies (horizontal flexibility). On the other, it means eliminating the possibility of distributing foreign-policy making between the member state level and the European level (vertical flexibility). The remainder of this section, however, will focus on horizontal flexibility, i.e. the exploitation of national comparative foreign policy advantages. What are national comparative foreign policy advantages? By virtue of having conquered and ruled much of the world for centuries, a number of European countries have brought longstanding foreign policy foci and networks into the EU (e.g. Spain and Latin America). Other special ties between member states and third parties may be explained by other historical factors and/or geographical proximity (e.g. Germanys ties with Israel or Finlands relationship with Russia). The special bilateral or plurilateral relationships enjoyed by EU members with third parties constitute national comparative foreign policy advantages that cannot be reproduced in Brussels. The implications of comparative advantages within the context of a FPS are manifold and not readily discernable. To be able to better understand the role of comparative advantages in EU foreign policy, it is useful to start by analyzing their direct effects both on the EU as a whole and on the individual member states possessing them. From the EUs collective viewpoint, a fragmented external foreign policy enables the Union to heighten its profile in third states or regions by channelling EU foreign policy through the foreign policy-making center enjoying a comparative advantage. This channelling process can be informal or formal. The rotating EU presidency, for example, has meant that the member state holding the presidency has often directed EU foreign policy attention towards countries with which it shares special bilateral relations. In fact, some member states have explicitly stated such EU foreign policy priorities in their EU presidential programs (e.g. Spain and Finland). Indeed, this mechanism is, in principle, self-enforcing given that member states have themselves incentives to exploit special relationships and serve as EU foreign policy-making centers. This is so because they can thereby increase their own national profile, both in third states and within the EU. The former results from the fact that EU membership amplifies a member states comparative advantage abroad by allowing it to represent (either formally or informally) the entire Union. The latter derives from the EUs interest to capitalize on individual member states comparative advantages in order to maximize its collective foreign policy influence in certain regions. A preliminary assessment of the role of comparative advantages suggests then that there exists a two-way, positive feedback relationship between national foreign policies and the EU framework. However, this is not the whole story. The systemic implications of comparative advantages are much less obvious, but arguably much more profound. They arise from the complexity of a FPS in which the foreign policy dimensions discussed earlier interact with each other to generate a stable equilibrium. More specifically, the fragmented external foreign policy dimension (on which national comparative foreign policy advantages hinge) relies heavily on the counterbalance provided by the internal foreign policy dimension. The two go hand in hand since the potential risks associated with external foreign policy fragmentation are muted by the EUs internal cohesion. This apparent paradox is a product of European history: states that had until recently engaged in reoccurring warfare and world-wide imperial competition with each other have, since the 1950s, built a single European market with a single currency, as well as a part-supranational, part-intergovernmental political structure that determines policies on a wide range of issues. The result is a bizarre juxtaposition of distinct national external foreign policy networks, military and diplomatic apparatuses, and foreign policy foci and styles on the one hand, and a convergent internal foreign policy pattern of European integration that has very much undermined traditional notions of foreign policy among EU members, on the other. This paradox has fundamentally altered the payoffs from external foreign policy fragmentation and the exploitation of comparative advantages. To begin with, benefits stemming from national comparative foreign policy advantages have become increasingly non-excludable to the wider Union; the higher the degree of European integration, the greater the extent of spill-over of a member states foreign policy outcomes to other member states. For example, the transatlantic bonds fostered primarily by the United Kingdoms (and other Atlanticist EU members) close ties to the US have become increasingly accessible to other, maybe less pro-American, members of the Union. When France distances itself from the US, criticizing or trying to frustrate American foreign policy actions, it does so knowing that as a member of the EU, it is unlikely to suffer serious commercial or security policy discrimination on the part of the US. The underlying reason is that the economic and political linkages (the EU-internal relationship) between the UK and France are too robust and far-reaching, preventing a third party from pursuing two separate, effective foreign policies towards them. The central point here is that the outside FPA no longer faces two distinct FPAs, but a FPS. The non-excludability of national foreign policy outcomes resulting from the EUs internal foreign policy dimension among member states thus lowers the costs of external foreign policy fragmentation, rendering the exploitation of national comparative advantages more attractive. In addition, the internal foreign policy dimension of the FPS eliminates the risk of serious international confrontation within the EU that could otherwise result from external foreign policy fragmentation. In our example, the divergent transatlantic policies followed by the UK and France are unlikely to cause serious damage to economic and political relations between the two member states given that they share a single market and are deeply embedded in the EUs political structures. Moreover, since the gains from national foreign policies have become to a large extent non-excludable, EU members are less and less concerned with the distribution of these gains. Put differently, the FPS diverts member states attention away from relative and towards absolute gains from national foreign policies, making policy divergence much less conflictual to begin with. In fact, while policies diverge, the underlying interests may be identical; member states thus may simply agree to disagree on their national foreign policy behavior. In sum, the EUs internal foreign policy dimension thus acts like an insurance policy against potential risks arising from external foreign policy divergence. In our example then, France (which certainly does not enjoy a comparative advantage in its relationship to the US) may have a strong interest in exploiting the UKs comparative transatlantic policy advantage. On the other side of the equation, the UK, aware of Frances US-critical stance, has an even stronger incentive to strengthen its role as a transatlantic policy-making center. Taking this analysis a step further, one can interpret the concept of comparative advantage literally, i.e. the way an economist would, and come to the conclusion that comparative advantages in a market setting encourages specialization and trade, ultimately maximizing utility for both the individual and the group. While I do not want to take this analogy too far, it is nevertheless a useful way of highlighting the role of institutions in shaping actors behavior. Individuals in a market economy take risks by specializing since they give up their self-sufficiency, becoming dependent on goods from others through trade. Only in the presence of an institution that guarantees access to the market and guarantees exchange will specialization occur and improve individual and collective welfare. In the foreign-policy market of the EU, the internal foreign policy dimension provides this institutional function. It is because France cannot be excluded from British foreign policy goods (and vice versa) that it can specialize according to its own comparative advantage. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, this system is self-enforcing. Just as individuals in a market economy specialize out of self-interest, without the need for central planning, EU member states align their foreign policies according to comparative advantages in the absence of central foreign policy planning in Brussels. An invisible hand leads to efficient and mutually beneficial policy-making allocations. To summarize, this section has attempted to outline the concept of comparative foreign policy advantage in the context of a FPS. The equilibrium between the fragmented external and the internal foreign policy dimensions allows for, and may even encourage, external foreign policy differentiation and specialization among member states. This analysis of comparative advantages, however, has said little so far about their contribution to a FPSs foreign policy effectiveness. The contribution of national comparative advantages to EU enlargement has already been touched upon earlier. However, the interaction of a FPSs foreign policy dimensions has much broader, geo-political implications. These will be the subject of the next and final section. FPS and the EUs geo-political role Having discussed the concept of comparative foreign policy advantage within the context of a FPS, the key question, of course, is to what extent a FPS produces effective foreign policy outcomes: To what extent can a FPS promote stability, pre-empt, manage or diffuse international conflicts, and project power? To what extent can it achieve these objectives more easily or effectively than a FPA? More specifically, how does a FPS fit into a global system made up of FPAs, i.e. what are the systemic implications of a FPSs interplay with FPAs? Since this paper argues that the persistence of a FPS (the non-emergence of a CFSP) can be explained solely by external variables, i.e. by its foreign policy effectiveness, rather than by EU-internal obstacles to further European integration, geo-political conditions must be decisive in shaping the EUs foreign policy dimension(s). Our attention thus has to turn to characteristics of the international system that create systemic demands for the persistence of a FPS. I argue that there are in particular two geo-political scenarios which create such demands: First, a (potentially) unstable periphery involving nation states (FPAs) that can be subjected to gravitational foreign policy influence by being offered the perspective of membership to the FPS; and second, (potentially) hostile relations between two or more outside FPAs with which member states of the FPS maintain special relationships (national comparative foreign policy advantages). The first scenario has already been discussed above. To recap the argument, gravitational influence is unique to a FPS since it depends on the existence of a strong internal foreign policy dimension: only an international system can attract outside nation states to join. Gravitational influence may also depend (albeit to a lesser extent) on a FPSs fragmented external foreign policy dimension in as far as special relationships of member states with their non-member neighbors tend to encourage enlargement. However, gravitational influence ultimately has geographical and political limits and is thus finite. The demands for the persistence of a FPS arising out of this scenario may therefore erode over time or disappear altogether. Indeed, the definition of permanent external borders is likely to be a necessary condition for the EUs transformation from a FPS to a FPA. However, it would not be a sufficient one. The second scenario may still justify the persistence of a FPS. The equilibrium between a FPSs fragmented external and internal foreign policy dimensions has the potential to play a decisive role in diffusing, managing or pre-empting hostile relations among outside FPAs. To use another analogy, a FPS is in a position to act as a shock-absorber among FPAs. Like a shock-absorber, it has the capacity to reduce tensions among outsiders by internalizing them. Individual foreign policy-making centers are permitted (even encouraged, as we have seen) to move into different directions as a function of both their comparative advantages and the varying external pressures and opportunities confronting the Union. While the ensuing divergence of EU member states policies may at times lead to tensions among the member states themselves (internalization), the EUs internal foreign policy dimension is sufficiently robust to absorb these tensions. The internal foreign policy dimension becomes the spring inside the shock-absorber. The foreign policy effect is that the EU has a systemic tendency to place itself between FPAs experiencing mutual tensions or hostilities, thereby cushioning or improving interstate relations that may otherwise risk deteriorating or perpetuating conflict. As such, the EU by virtue of being a FPS enjoys its very own, global comparative advantage over FPAs in managing and diffusing conflict. Empirically, the shock-absorbing function of the EU manifests itself both in concrete (external) foreign policy situations and in the Unions systemic position in the geo-political structure. The settlement of the Kosovo crisis serves as a good example of a specific foreign policy situation of this sort. While a detailed discussion of this case study would fill several pages, suffice it to touch on the key role played by national comparative foreign policy advantages of three key member states in particular the United Kingdom, Finland, and Greece. The United Kingdom provided transatlantic cooperation to exert military (NATO) pressure on Serbia. Its main comparative advantages were its close ties to the US, its military capabilities, and its lack of close ties with Serbia. Alongside US/NATO-critical Russia, Finish President Martti Ahtisaari, the chief negotiator the EU, led final talks with the Milosevic regime. Finlands main comparative advantages were its neutrality and its close ties to Russia. Finally, Greece maintained diplomatic relations with Serbia throughout the crisis and negotiated access for EU humanitarian aid. Greeces comparative advantages were its proximity to Serbia and consequently its close economic and cultural ties with its neighbor. In this example then, the FPS permitted the exploitation and amplification of national comparative advantages by encouraging the pursuit of distinct and explicitly dissociated national foreign policies. The shock-absorbing function was significant for US-Russian relations and the diffusion of anti-Western sentiment in Serbia (and elsewhere in Eastern Europe). On the structural level, the legacy of the Cold War has left behind a geo-political environment of remaining East-West tensions, placing the EU in between. The Unions contribution to overcoming these remaining divisions go beyond enlargement, involving the delicate balance within the EU between persisting transatlantic forces on the one hand (Atlanticist member states), and neutral, pan-European forces on the other (Continentalist and neutral member states). In fact, such a balance may have been crucial in legitimizing both NATO and EU eastward expansion in the first place. As such, the EUs geo-political position was dissociated from a US-dominated security regime upheld by a subset of EU member states (i.e. active NATO members). With the demise of East-West tensions, the overall, structural effectiveness of a FPS may progressively erode. However, the current US-led War on Terror and a persisting Israeli-Palestine conflict may exacerbate other polarizations e.g. between the US and the Arab world creating new systemic demands for a shock-absorbing FPS. In this light, the current external policy fragmentation between the British and Franco-German camps may play a significant role in permitting the EU to reconcile its interest in maintaining a working transatlantic relationship with its equally strong interest in preserving its capacity as a legitimate political partner for its Arab neighbors and a credible negotiator in the Middle East. Moreover, given the profoundly different nature of the terrorist threat (in contrast to traditional inter-state threats), the aggregation and centralization of military power and political clout at the European level maybe of little use to begin with. Should the War on Terror produce a new scenario of global polarization, the EU may instead have to think about how it can enhance its shock-absorbing capacity. In this context, the question of Turkish EU membership, for example, may turn into a much more profound issue of EU foreign policy effectiveness. Having Turkey within the Union may considerably enhance the EUs foreign policy effectiveness in dealing with growing Arab-Western tensions. In fact, the long-term external foreign policy benefits of including Turkey in the EU could be at least as significant as the medium-term benefits of gravitational foreign policy towards Turkey. Ultimately, the EU will have to consider the totality of these benefits when analyzing the pros and cons of Turkish membership. Interestingly, the arguments against Turkish membership focus on the (potentially) harmful consequences for the EUs internal foreign policy dimension, i.e. on whether it is possible to accommodate Turkey within the EU structure. In the end then, the EU will have to find a way to balance its foreign policy interests relating to all three dimensions, the internal, the gravitational and the external. Finally, it is important to remember that while there may be high costs associated with a permanent, constitutional move from a FPS to a FPA, a FPS still has the option to act like a FPA when it is in its interest to do so. But as a FPS it can limit FPA-type actions to specific foreign policy situations, specific third parties, or specific issue areas. In short, a FPS does not exclude the FPA option (while the reverse is the case). The current EU-led civil and military missions in the Balkans and the Democratic Republic of the Congo suggest that the EU is, at least in principle, fully capable of FPA-type initiatives. However, one would expect that these actions are limited to cases where the foreign policy benefits arising from a FPA outweigh those arising from a FPS. Conclusions This paper has argued that a CFSP has not materialized in the EU because the costs of moving from a FPS to a FPA do not justify the benefits, as measured in foreign policy effectiveness. Both individual member states and the EU as a whole have benefited from a FPS that constitutes a prerequisite for EU enlargement and encourages member states to exploit comparative foreign policy advantages towards the wider international system. To understand the benefits of a FPS it is essential to move away from traditional notions of foreign policy and analyze the interplay of three distinct foreign policy dimensions the internal, the gravitational, and the external (both fragmented and unified). So far, by limiting their analyses to the unified external dimension, scholars have underestimated the breadth and depth of EU foreign policy and failed to adequately account for the costs and benefits of a CFSP. Finally, the FPS approach raises new questions about the dynamics of European integration. First, it suggests that policy integration in one area may not follow the same institutional logic as integration in another. Although beyond the scope of this paper, there are good reasons to believe that the effectiveness of a FPA-type governance structure is much greater in the trade or development policy domains, for example, than in the broader foreign and security policy area. Second, it raises the question of whether policy divergence is necessarily reflective of integration deficiencies. By taking into account the underlying interests of member states and the systemic implications of their policies, one may arrive at very different conclusions. Just as increasing divergence in production patterns (i.e. specialization) is a distinct feature of a working market economy, national foreign policy differentiation may be a distinct feature of a working FPS. These issues touch on questions of institutional design and its implications for individual and group welfare. Finally, the FPS approach raises the question of ideational spill-over. EU member states successful experience with regional integration has significantly impacted on their perceptions of the appropriate means and goals of foreign policy more generally. These perceptions infiltrate and ultimately define both the EUs approach towards its periphery and its broader role on the world stage. For the EU, a FPS may be the framework that best corresponds to these underlying ideas about foreign policy methods and objectives.  Roy Ginsberg writes that theorists struggle with defining and categorizing European foreign policy behaviour. [] If one views European foreign policy solely through the lenses of a neofunctionalist or realist intergovernmentalist, little will be learned. Given how multidimensional European foreign policy is, it may never lend itself to a general theory. Ginsberg, Roy. Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Theoretical Capability-Expectations Gap. Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.37, No.3 (September 1999), pp.432-450; For a similar assessment, see Rummel, Reinhardt, ed. The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europes New Assertiveness. Westview, San Francisco, 1990, p.54.  Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), Title V, Article J.  and, to a lesser extent, among EU institutions. To simplify the argument, however, I will assume that foreign-policy making at the EU-level is unified at all times.  I write may since gravitational foreign policy is optional.  For a tentative discussion of the potential benefits of foreign policy fragmentation, see Mller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Gisela. Die Mehrdimensionalitt der EU-Auenbeziehungen. In Die Europische Union als Akteur der Weltpolitik. Schubert, Klaus and Gisela Mller-Brandeck-Bocquet eds. Leske&Budrich. Opladen, 2000.  Traditional approaches focusing on EU-internal obstacles (sovereignty issues, divergent interests, etc.) to explaining the non-emergence or slow emergence of a CFSP include: Gordon, Philip H. Europes Uncommon Foreign Policy. International Security, Vol.22, No.3 (Winter 1997/98); Hoffmann, Stanley. Towards a Common European Foreign and Security Policy? Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.38, No.2 (June 2000); Waltz, Kenneth N. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000); Mearsheimer, John J. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War. International Security. Vol.15, No.1 (Summer 1990); Smith, Michael E. Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Cooperation. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol.7, No.4 (October 2000); Glarbo, Kenneth. Wide-awake Diplomacy: Reconstructing the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy. Vol6, No.4 (Special Issue 1999); Howorth, Jolyon. European Defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately? Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol.39, No.4 (November 2001).  For a detailed discussion of the EUs role in Spains democratization process, see: Malefakis, Edward. Spain and Its Francoist Heritage. In Herz, John H., ed. From Dictatorship to Democracy. Westport, Greenwood, 1982  The Balkan wars have arguably been the result of an insufficiently timely and extensive exertion of gravitational influence towards the region on the part of the EU.  Enlargement requires intergovernmental consensus and is administered by the European Commission.  Lily Gardener Feldman notes that the diversity of historical perspectives [] has the potential to increase the legitimacy of the EU as an international actor. French links with its former colonies, for example, have provided a source of strength and legitimacy for the EU in its relations with Africa. And German links with Central and Eastern Europe have a similar potential. Feldman, Lily Gardner. Reconciliation and Legitimacy: Foreign relations and enlargement of the European Union. In Legitimacy and the European Union: The Contested Polity. Banchoff, Thomas and Mitchell P. Smith, eds. Routledge, London 1999, p.74.  A country holding the EU presidency or any official EU mandate (e.g. French leadership of the EU mission in the Congo) is in a position to formally represent or act on behalf of the Union. At the informal level, member states may contribute to EU policy in the absence of an explicit, institutionalized representational function, such as Spains underlying role in EU-Mercosur negotiations or Finish brokerage between the EU and Russia during the Kosovo crisis.  Portugals representation of the EU in the context of the East Timor crisis is a case in point. See Schubert, Klaus. Auf dem Wege zu neuen Formen der Staatlichkeit und zu einer neuen Qualitt von Auenpolitik? In Die Europische Union als Akteur der Weltpolitik. Schubert, Klaus and Gisela Mller-Brandeck-Bocquet eds. Leske&Budrich. Opladen, 2000, pp.23-4. In Schuberts words through regional political association, even small countries in the EU or very specific concerns of single member states can become the subject of world politics, which would be virtually impossible in isolation. For a discussion of the Finish case, see Arter, David. Small State Influence Within the EU: The Case of Finlands Northern Dimension Initiative. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No.5 (December 2000), p. 691.  In fact, a member states external special relationship may even serve as a direct bargaining chip at the EU-internal level.  It is again important to keep in mind that a FPS is itself a foreign policy outcome (internal dimension). Indeed, a FPS proves its internal foreign policy effectiveness to a large extent through its very existence since it reflects a high level of inter-state cooperation and integration. Therefore, the following analysis will exclude the internal dimension when discussing the foreign policy effectiveness of a FPS.  A detailed discussion of the Kosovo crisis as an example of effective fragmented external foreign policy is included in my undergraduate Political Science honors thesis Explaining the Expectations-Performance Gap of CFSP, Columbia University (2002).     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