ࡱ>  ڳbjbj 4%*:JJJ^^^8rl^<.";;;;;;;$3=?h;J;JJ;JJJJJ;J;JJ24uX3p;;0<3M@2M@,4M@J4X"J);;l<M@ :  Magdalena Frennhoff Larsn PhD candidate (second year) University of Westminster larsen@gunnarla.charitydays.co.uk Paper prepared for the European Foreign Policy Conference London School of Economics, 2-3 June 2004 Power and Pressure in EU Agenda-Setting - A Case Study of Negotiations between the EU and South Africa Introduction In 1999 the European Union and South Africa concluded a Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement (TDCA) after four years of intense negotiations. It was the most ambitious trade agreement the EU had ever reached with a third country outside its geographically closest circle of friends. The aim of this paper is to explore the agenda-setting role and power of the Commission in these negotiations, using a theoretical framework based on Robert Putnams two- (extended to three-) level game model (Evans et. Al 1993; Putnam 1988) and Mark Pollacks theory of delegation, agency and agenda-setting (Pollack 2003). The framework helps to explore which actors were able to put pressure on the Commission during the agenda-setting stage, and the extent to which the Commission had the power to push through its own agenda once it was formulated in the negotiations that lead to the TDCA. A qualitative research method based on semi-structured interviews with Commission officials is used. The paper starts with a brief summary of the actual negotiations. Second, it presents the theoretical framework and offers an initial application on the EU-South Africa case. Third, it highlights one of the problems of the theoretical framework and suggests a possible solution. And fourth, it concludes by touching upon the anticipated conclusions. It must be emphasised that this is work in progress, and it presents only preliminary findings. Negotiating the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement The negotiations, which were conducted by the government of South Africa and the European Commission representing the EU, formally started in June 1995 when the Council of Ministers provided the Commission with the negotiating directive, or a mandate, for a long-term cooperation with South Africa. In March 1996 the Commission received a complimentary mandate for a Trade and Cooperation Agreement. The mandates proposed a twin-track approach aimed at making South Africa a qualified member of the then Lom Convention (allowing it to fully participate in the political institutions of the Convention, such as the EU-ACP Council of Ministers, the ACP-EC Committee of Ambassadors and the ACP-EU Joint Assembly, and to benefit from a limited number of financial provisions, such as the ability to tender for projects under the 8th European Development Fund) and establishing a bilateral agreement between the EU and South Africa (Sudworth and Van Hove 1998: p. 3). The reason for this twin-track approach was the ambiguous status of South Africa - it is neither considered a developing country at the same level as other ACP countries, nor a fully industrialized country due to its uneven distribution of wealth (Asante 1997: p. 1). In October 1999, after four years, 24 rounds of negotiations, and many intense disputes, the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement between the EU and South Africa was signed. As with the majority of international negotiations, much of the bargaining took place before the formal negotiations between the EU and South Africa had even started. Within the EU the negotiations were initiated in March 1995 as DG Development of the Commission presented its initial Communication for a negotiating directive (SEC (95) 486) to the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. After three months of negotiations between representatives of the Member State governments, the then 113 Committee (now 133 Committee) of the Council was able to agree a directive, which was transmitted to COREPER and subsequently to the General Affairs Council. This mandate then allowed the Commission to initiate negotiations with South Africa. Theoretical Framework and Analysis The framework used when analysing the agenda-setting role and power of the Commission in its negotiations with South Africa is based on theories developed by Robert Putnam and Mark Pollack. Putnams two- (extended to three-) level game model provides an overall framework for the negotiation process highlighting the different levels of negotiations as well as the actors on which the Commission might have wielded its power of influence as it tried to push through its agenda, and who, in turn, might have been able to put pressure on the Commission as it developed its agenda in the first place. It also offers examples of strategies available to the Commission in its negotiations with the Member States and South Africa. Part of Pollacks theory of delegation, agency and agenda-setting focuses specifically on the agenda-setting power of the Commission, and helps explore the conditions under which the Commission was able to push through its agenda despite resistance from the Member States in the negotiations. 3.1. The Three-Level Game Framework (Putnam) When the EU negotiates with third parties, such as South Africa, the Commission negotiating team interacts with the third party itself and its subnational constituencies, the Member States in the Council of Ministers (and to a certain degree the European Parliament and other sections of the Commission), and sub-national and transnational groups within the EU. In its interactions it may influence, as well as be subject to pressure from, these three levels of actors. This structure can be likened to a revision of Robert Putnams two-level game framework (extending it to a three-level game), which constitutes a framework for the interaction of national and international negotiations (Evans; Jacobson; and Putnam 1993). In this two-level game framework the national representative (from hereon referred to as the negotiator) is the key person uniting the domestic and international arenas. The negotiator is negotiating in both arenas alternately, and the results from each negotiation are reverberated in the other arena. He or she must both reach an international agreement, and ensure its domestic ratification. (Putnam 1988: p. 434). In Putnams two-level game framework, Level I refers to the negotiating process on the international arena, and Level II to the national discussion between different domestic groups. The negotiators are the link between the two levels. Their main task at Level I is to compose a tentative agreement, which will have to be ratified at Level II (Putnam 1988: p. 436). At Level II the negotiators have to coordinate the different domestic opinions in order to reach a unified domestic view that can serve as terms of reference in international negotiations at Level I. The different domestic groups are however involved all through the Level I negotiation process. As these discussions proceed and new issues appear, the negotiators need opinions and advice of their domestic constituents, in order to make sure that the negotiated agreement actually will be ratified at Level II in the end (Evans, Jacobson and Putnam1993: p. 23). In the analysis of the agenda-setting role and power of the Commission during the negotiations between the EU and South Africa, Putnams framework does not capture the whole negotiation process. A third level is needed, as the EU constitutes an international organisation in itself. Consequently it serves both as the international arena in the negotiations between the EU Member States, and as the domestic arena in the negotiations between the EU and South Africa. Putnam himself is aware of this general problem and acknowledges that many institutional arrangements require several levels of ratification, thus multiplying the complexity of the analysis. He gives the example of when the EU is negotiating with the United States over agricultural trade, and argues that in order to understand these negotiations you need to look both within the Union and inside the Member States (Putnam 1988: p. 449). Others have also adapted the two-level game to a three-level game when analysing negotiations between the EU and third parties (e.g. Collinson 1999; Moyer 1993; Patterson 1997; Pollack 2003; Zartman 1993). The structure of the three different levels in the negotiations between the EU and South Africa is outlined in Figure 1. The three levels are linked by the negotiators: the EU representative (the Commission) and the South African representative link Levels I and II, and the Member State representatives link Levels II and III. The single line indicators demonstrate a formal presence at the respective negotiating table or arena. The dotted lines indicate the possibility of influence without being present at the negotiating table.  Figure 1: The Three-Level Game Model The first set of negotiations take place within the Member States of the EU (now referred to as Level III), i.e. on the Member State domestic arenas. The negotiator, i.e. the national representative needs to find out what his domestic constituents, such as different governmental departments, parliament, NGOs, the business sector and trade unions, are willing to offer to South Africa, and what kind of benefits they expect from the agreement between South Africa and the EU. Although the negotiator linking Levels III and II is the national representative and not the Commission, which is linking Levels II and I, the Commission is still an active player at this level; both in trying to rally support for its agenda, and in being subject to pressure from these groups as it prepares its initial agenda. The flow of these pressures and influences between the Commission and the national constituencies in the Member States is demonstrated by the indicator linking the EU representative (the Commission) and the Member States domestic arenas in Figure 1. The next level of the negotiations is the Union level (Level II) or the EU arena, in which the national representatives of the fifteen Member States have to agree a mandate based on the proposal presented to them by the Commission. The Commission is present during these Council negotiations which mainly takes place within the 113 (now 133) Committee and although theoretically it does not have a role once it has presented its proposal, in practice it tends to work as a mediator between the different interests of the Member States. Once the Council has provided the Commission with a mandate, the 113 (now 133) Committee continues to be involved in the negotiations as the Commission has to report back to the Council all through its negotiations with South Africa. At the Union level the European Parliament is also able to influence the negotiations through its readings and ability to pose questions to the Commission. In addition, the actual Commission negotiating team has to liaise with other sections and DGs of the Commission itself in order to make sure that the policies proposed are compatible with different interests within the Commission. The third level of negotiations is that between the EU and South Africa (Level I), the international arena. The negotiators, i.e. the representatives from the EU (the Commission) and South Africa negotiate an agreement that complies with international norms at the same time as they please domestic demands. Although the Commission has the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the EU, the international agreement reached with South Africa has to be ratified by the national representatives at the Union level. Similarly the government of South Africa has to go back to its domestic constituencies (South Africas Level II) to ensure that it will obtain their ratification for the agreement. Here it should be noted that the domestic constituencies in South Africa, such as businesses and NGOs, also have the possibility to influence and put pressure on the Commission directly, and the Commission has the opportunity to try and rally support for its proposals among the domestic constituencies of South Africa. This flow of influence is demonstrated by the indicator linking the Commission and the South African domestic arena in Figure 1. 3.1.1. Influential Actors Judging from the initial empirical investigation into the agenda-setting stage of the EU-South Africa negotiations, the EU institutions at Level II in particular certain DGs of the Commission - and the South African government at Level I had a significant impact on the Commission negotiating team. During 1994 there were two preparatory missions from DG Trade to South Africa with the aim of exploring the possibility for a future partnership between the EU and South Africa. South Africas request for full membership of the Lom Convention was denied because of its relative wealth, and South Africa was instead asked to consider negotiations for a Free Trade Area agreement with a developmental aspect. During this time the European Parliament strongly supported South Africa in its request for full Lom membership (European Parliament A5-0020/99), and although it did not change the offer established by the DG Trade mission, it was decided that the main responsibility for the negotiations should be with DG Development rather than DG Trade. To a certain extent this was seen as a concession to Parliament, and it was also thought that DG Development would be in a better position to sell the deal to South Africa (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 26/05/04). The Task Force for negotiations with South Africa (TFSA) was set up in DG Development, and during the period before March 1995 when it presented its initial proposal for a mandate to the Council, it liaised with the government of South Africa and came up with the twin-track approach, aimed at making South Africa a qualified member of the Lom Convention and establishing a bilateral agreement. Although South Africa initially had asked for full Lom membership, this twin-track approach also reflected the division within South Africa between those, including ANC, who argued that South Africa is part of Africa and consequently should be offered full access to Lom, and those, including industry and the Department for Trade and Industry, who saw Lom as a post colonial structure and who preferred a more equal relationship with Europe that would attract investors (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 20/04/04). Civil society in South Africa had a limited direct impact on the Commission agenda. The Commission did not engage in any dialogue with South African NGOs in order to demonstrate that it had confidence in the newly democratically elected government. In addition, it was in no doubt that the view of civil society was delivered by the South African government given the powerful role of civil society in South Africa and the fact that many representatives from NGOs were part of the government. The groups from South Africa that did lobby the Commission were some of the industry sectors which had reservations about the free trade agreement, such as the food canning industry, the fishery industry and the car industry. However, the Commission did not take their views on board as it saw them as unrepresentative of the view of South Africa as a whole, and the government in particular (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 20/04/04). Regarding Level III pressure, the Commission was subject to lobbying from both NGOs and industry within the EU. Throughout the negotiations NGOs pressured the Commission to offer South Africa full access to Lom. However, the decision to negotiate a Free Trade Area agreement was fixed, and full access to Lom was seen as unrealistic. Consequently the pressure from NGOs on that issue was ineffective. Regarding other issues the impact of NGOs was also limited, but mainly because their views corresponded considerably with those of DG Development, and thus were already incorporated in the mandate. The industrial pressure was also futile, as one Commission official explained, it is not the habit of the Commission, not at least [DG] Development to go for that sort of pressure. (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 26/05/2004). The pressure from the Member States on the proposal for the first mandate, which presented the structure for the two track approach in 1995, was very restricted. The Commission was able to use the pressure from the European Parliament, which criticised the Commission for not offering South Africa full Lom access, to convince the Council to adopt the mandate. However, during the preparation of the second mandate, which was to contain the lists of products not to be included in the Free Trade Area agreement, the Commission was subject to a lot of pressure from the Member States. They each presented their own lists of products to be excluded from the Free Trade Area agreement. But rather than taking all of these requests on board, which would have lead to a much diluted agreement, the Commission had to mediate between the different interests of the Member States to be able to present an attractive offer to South Africa (Interview, retired Commission official, Brussels, 26/05/04). In other words, the Commission had to use its autonomy and act as a political entrepreneur. 3.1.2. Autonomy of the Negotiator in the Two/Three-Level Game Although negotiators might be expected to act merely as agents on behalf of their domestic constituencies, Putnam follows the logic of the principal-agent model and argues that negotiators are likely to have their own interest which they try to pursue. The negotiator is the central strategic actor in international negotiations and his or her strategies reflect a simultaneous double-edged calculation of constraints and opportunities on both the domestic and international boards (Moravcsik 1993: p. 17). This central position gives the negotiator the opportunity to act autonomously and employ different strategies within the boundaries of what Putnam terms the domestic win-set. A win-set includes all the possible negotiating outcomes that are acceptable to domestic constituencies (Putnam 1988: p. 437). 3.1.2.1. The Size of the Win-Set In order for an international agreement to be reached there generally needs to be an overlap between the win-sets of the different negotiators. The larger the win-sets at Level II, the more likely it is that they will overlap and consequently that an agreement will follow. A large win-set gives the negotiator a great amount of room to play on. And vice versa, the smaller the win-sets at Level II, the less likely it is that they will overlap and the prospect of an international agreement will disappear (ibid. p. 437-438). In the EU-South Africa negotiations, as in most negotiations between the EU and third countries, the Commission was seen as a rigid negotiator with room for little flexibility (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: p. 64). This was due to the fact that the mandate which corresponds to the win-set was a result of long negotiations in the Council, and it reflected compromises and trade-offs between the fifteen Member States. Consequently, any request from South Africa which would lead to a deviation from the mandate would affect the balance of interests of the Member States, and most likely be unacceptable (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 20/04/04). Thus, the win-set of the Commission was very small, which might explain why it took four years to reach an agreement. 3.1.2.2. The Relative Size of the Win-Set The relative size of the win-sets is also of importance as it affects the distribution of joint gains from the negotiation. If the domestic win-set of a negotiator is much broader than the other negotiators win-set (and this is known to the negotiators around the table), his or her ability to put pressure on the negotiations is limited as the others know that most agreements will be accepted by his or her constituents. Conversely, a small domestic win-set may be a negotiating advantage as it makes it clear to the opponent that there is little room for flexibility and that he or she needs to accept the offer as it stands (Putnam 1988: p. 440). In the EU-South Africa negotiations the win-set of the Commission was smaller than that of South Africa. South Africa was well aware of the fact that the Commission had to get approval from the Member States, and it often felt that the Commission had its hands tied (Interview, retired Commission official, Brussels, 26/05/04). 3.1.2.3. Changing the Size of the Win-Set The negotiator might be able to use its autonomy to change the size of the domestic win-set. Although the preferences of domestic groups are assumed to be constant in this model, the negotiator might through its role as agenda-setter put forward the issues in such a way that they appeal to those domestic constituencies which normally would be unwilling to accept the issue in question, or he or she might employ issue-linking strategies which can cause domestic constituencies to accept some unfavourable outcomes provided they get it their way on other issues (Moravcsik 1993: p. 25). Putnam also highlights the possibility of synergistic issue linkage. This is not a way of changing the preferences of any domestic constituents, but rather [a way of] creating a new policy option that was previously beyond domestic control (Putnam 1988: p. 447). The negotiations might produce an outcome which is more far-reaching than what was expected by any of the internal win-sets. In the EU-South Africa negotiations, one of the main tasks, according to a senior Commission official, was to recreate flexibility within the mandate, and to be able to massage the mandate along the process, so that the Member States [would] accept something in the end that they had not proved in the beginning (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 20/04/04). One example of how the Commission was able to change the win-set, or massage the mandate was when some Member States in the South, i.e. Spain, Italy and Portugal, were unwilling to offer South Africa concessions on oranges, as it was felt it would cause competition to their domestic production. The Commission then offered South Africa a concession on apples and pears, something which South Africa had not asked for. Yet the Commission insisted that South Africa accepted the offer, as apples and pears mainly grow in the northern Member States, i.e. Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. Once the offer had been accepted by South Africa the Commission could go back to the Member States and request a concession on oranges and on apples and oranges, and thus maintain the regional balance among the Member States. The same Commission official explained that when there is an issue which some Member States do not agree with you have to store it somewhere. And progressively you have to find issues which ask a little bit of each of the fifteen Member States (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 20/04/04). 3.2. The Delegation, Agency and Agenda-Setting Theory (Pollack) Mark Pollacks theory of delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the EU is based on the principle-agent model (Pollack 2003). In this model political actors are divided into principals and agents. The principals hold the political power but have agreed to delegate some tasks to agents. The reasons for this delegation may be the principals lack of expertise about certain technical issues, too much of a workload, or a preference among principals not to interact directly with each other in certain policy domains (Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998: p. 93). The relationship between the principals and the agents is characterised by conflicting preferences and information asymmetry which may cause the agents to act upon their own interests rather than those of their principals (Tallberg 2003: p. 5). Pollack likens the principals to the Member States of the EU and the agents to the supranational organisations, i.e. the Commission, the Parliament and the Court of Justice. This division between principals and agents reflects the broader debate about whether European institutions matter and to what extent they are autonomous vis--vis the Member States. At one end of this debate is the intergovernmental approach (e.g. Garrett 1992; Keohane and Hoffmann 1991; Moravcsik 1998, 1999), which argues that the preferences of, and the bargaining between, the Member States play the decisive role in determining EU policy. At the other end is the supranational or neo-functionalist approach (e.g. Cram 1997; Sandholtz 1992; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989), which argues that policy-making in the EU is not just the result of preferences of, and bargaining among, its Member State governments. The Member States are constrained in their actions by the supranational institutions, which are able to exert an independent influence on policy outcomes and the integration process in the EU. However, few scholars would fully embrace one or the other of the two extremes of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, and most recognise that there is a little of both in the EU system of governance. In certain policy areas the EU leans more towards a supranational system of governance, and in other areas the policy outcomes can be explained by looking at the preferences of, and co-operation between, the Member States. The principal-agent model in itself does not take sides in this debate. Rather, it is moving beyond the debate by determining the conditions under which the Commission is likely to have the ability to set and push through its agenda. It provides a tool for explaining variations in supranational influence (e.g. Pollack 2003; Schmidt 2000; Tallberg 2000). When setting out his theory of delegation, agency, and agenda-setting in the EU, Pollack looks at two stages of the principal-agent relationship. First, he explores the delegation stage when principals (the Member States) decide to delegate some of their powers to agents (the supranational organisations). Second, Pollack focuses on the post-delegation stage and explores the extent to which the supranational agents, once created, develop their own preferences different from those of their Member State principals, and under what conditions the agents are able act upon these preferences and influence outcomes in international relations. He argues that it is particularly in the area of agenda-setting where the supranational agents are faced with the possibility of influencing the decision-making of the Member States (ibid. p. 7). For the analysis of the Commissions agenda-setting power in its negotiations with South Africa, this second stage the agenda-setting stage of Pollacks theory is the most relevant. Within the agenda-setting, Pollack distinguishes between formal and informal agenda-setting. An agent possesses formal agenda-setting when it has been given the right of legislative initiative, i.e. the right to present proposals for consideration by the Member States. In most of the EU policy areas, including trade (Art 113 EEC - now Art 133 EC), the Commission has the sole right of initiative. Consequently, the Commission possessed formal agenda-setting in the area of negotiating a trade agreement between the EU and South Africa. It was the Commission that developed the initial proposal for the negotiating directive, or mandate, that the Member States then had to agree upon in the Council. Informal agenda-setting is the ability of the supranational agent to set the substantive agenda by defining issues and proposals in such a way that they get the approval of the Member State principals. This informal agenda-setting is often referred to as political entrepreneurship (e.g. Cram 1994; Hooghe and Keating 1994; Pollack 2003; Wallace and Wallace 2000). According to Pollack, the informal agenda-setting powers of the supranational agent are greatest when (1) information is incomplete and the agent possesses more information than its principals; (2) there are low distributional consequences between the Member States; and (3) the agent is able to mobilise latent transnational coalitions to support its proposal (Pollack 2003: pp. 51-52). In the case of the TDCA negotiations some very preliminary and limited evidence has been found in relation to these conditions. 3.2.1. Asymmetrical Information As the Commission was granted the role as sole negotiator on behalf of the EU vis--vis South Africa, the Commission represented the EU. Apart from the opening of the negotiations and the signing ceremony, no Member States were present at the negotiation table. This gave the Commission a considerable informational advantage over the Member States. Although the Commission negotiators had a practice of holding a meeting with the Member States representatives following each negotiation round to inform them about progress and to ask for advice and guidance, it could still choose the way in which it presented its information (Interview, Commission official, DG Trade, Brussels, 26/05/04). There were attempts by some Member States to bring in issues outside the Communitys competence, such as migration. However, the Commission resisted this attempt in order to ensure that the agreement remained fully within the competence of the Community, and that the Member States would not be involved in the actual negotiations. As one Commission official put it: if you are to do business, you cant have them [the Member States] in your neck (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 26/05/04). 3.2.2. Low distributional consequences between the Member States The political importance attached to the negotiations was extremely high. The issue was on the COREPER agenda nearly every week for two years. Needless to say, the enthusiasm surrounding South Africa at the time of the end of apartheid was very strong, and the EU Member States were eager to show their support and commitment to re-enter South Africa in the international community. However, as one Commission official argued, this Mandela syndrome did not endure for the four years that the negotiations lasted, and it was mainly a phenomenon apparent in the northern Member States (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 20/04/04). A more often cited reason for the importance attached to the negotiations was that fact that South Africa was seen as a test case for future free trade agreements with distant countries. Until then, the EU did not have any free trade agreements with countries apart from its direct neighbours in Europe and North Africa. If the EU-South Africa negotiations were successful it was thought that they would open up a whole new wave of free trade agreements with third countries (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 26/05/04). However, the future trade agreement between the EU and South Africa was of limited economic importance to the Member States. South Africa accounted for only 1.9% of EU imports and 1.3% of its exports (Sudworth and Van Hove 1998). The most contentious issue was agriculture, which mainly affected the Member States in the South of Europe as their production is similar to that of South Africa, with a focus on wine and citrus fruits. However, as already mentioned in section 3.1.2.3., the Commission managed to maintain low distributional consequences, by including products that were produced in the North of Europe, such as cheese, milk powder and apples, in the Agreement as well (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 26/05/04). It was not a case of the southern Member States not wanting to offer concessions to South Africa. Rather, they did not want to do it if they were the only ones making concessions. Similarly, the reaching of the agreement was facilitated by balancing the interests of the farming lobby in the South against a certain part of the industrial sector in the North - those car manufacturers that had been established in South Africa already during the apartheid era, and consequently were reluctant to opening up the South African market to cheaper cars from the EU (Interview, Commission official, Cape Town, 20/01/04). These are examples of how the Commission was able to act as a political entrepreneur and exercise its agenda-setting power to obtain an outcome which was more generous than the lowest common denominator among the Member States. 3.2.4. The Commissions ability to Mobilise Transnational Coalitions The Commission was subject to a considerable amount of lobbying from European NGOs born out of the anti-apartheid movement, such as ENIASA (European network for Information and Action on Southern Africa) and ACTSA (Action for Southern Africa). However, these networks mainly represented NGOs from a small number of Member States (the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark), and they did not interact directly with those groups in other Member States that had reservations about the agreement. Yet, they did play an important role in the European Parliament Development Committee, both through direct lobbying of the Parliamentarians and through their interactions with journalists following the committee meetings. Consequently they contributed to giving the EU-South Africa negotiations their high profile (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 20/04/04). Preferences in the Principal-Agent Model: A Theoretical Problem In order to describe an actor as rational, one needs to know the goals and preferences of that actor. The principal-agent model assumes that actors are utility-maximisers with fixed preferences. The actual formation of preferences is not the focus of attention of the model. There is a general view among EU scholars that the preferences of the Commission are pro-integrationist and that they seek to maximise the competences of the European Union (e.g. Peters 1992; Ross 1995; Cram 1997; Pollack 1998). In George Rosss words they seek more Europe (Ross 1995: p. 14). And in international trade negotiations the Commission is often considered more liberal and more in favour of free trade than most of the Member States (Meunier 2000: p. 112). However, this general notion of preferring further integration and liberalisation is quite vague and might not be helpful in every issue area in which the EU operates. In the negotiations between the EU and South Africa the preferences were divided along both political and sectorial lines, thus cutting across the Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission itself (Interview, Commission official, DG Dev, Brussels, 20/04/04. The Commission is a very complex institution, and in certain issue areas there might be competing interests within the Commission, which could not be accounted for if just accepting the assumption that the Commission is pro-integrationist and pro-liberalisation. The principal-agent model is based on the tension between the preferences of the supranational institution and the Member States. Yet, it does not go into any great detail of exploring what those preferences are. In order to use the principal-agent model more effectively, a separate study of the preference formation of the Commission would be helpful. Once the preferences are known in detail, it would be easier to carry out a detailed comparison between the preferences of the Commission and those of the Member States, and consequently to determine the agenda-setting power of the Commission. This is in line with Putnams argument that it is crucial to understand the preferences of the negotiator in order to be able to understand the outcome of an international negotiation. It is not enough to just look at the different interests of the domestic constituencies and assume that the outcome represents a compromise or the lowest common denominator between these different interests, as the negotiator has the power to play a significant role in influencing the outcome of the negotiation (Putnam 1988: p. 457). Conclusions The theoretical framework based on Putnams two-level game model and Pollacks theory on delegation, agency and agenda-setting offers a way of demonstrating the different levels of negotiations that are in play when the EU negotiates with a third party, and of exploring the agenda-setting power of the Commission. The preliminary findings of this paper suggest the EU institutions - in particular DG Trade and DG Development and the South African government were influential in shaping the Commission agenda. The paper also gives some indications that the informal agenda-setting role of the Commission was quite significant, and that it had the power to push through its agenda during its negotiations with South Africa despite certain resistance from some of the Member States. The Commission acted as a political entrepreneur and managed to massage the mandate by creating opportunities for issue-linkages and maintaining the regional balance between the fifteen Member States. However, although the framework highlights actors that might have been able to put pressure on the Commission during the agenda-setting stage, it lacks detailed investigation into of preference formation of the Commission. It is argued in this paper that it is important to know the preferences of the Commission and the Member States in order to effectively be able to apply the principle-agent model which is based on the tension between the preferences of the Commission and those of the Member States. To counter for this, a separate study of the actual agenda-setting should be carried out. By adding such a study, an overall, although not complete, picture of the agenda-setting process in the EU-South Africa negotiations would be obtained. References Asante, S.K.B. (1997): Too Strong for Partnership? The Future of European - South African Relations. 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(1993): Europe and Africa The New Phase (Lynne Rienner Publishers) Six interviews were held with Commission officials in Brussels and Cape Town between 20/01/04 and 26/05/04  Article 113, which was slightly amended and renamed Article 133 in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, grants the Community exclusive competence in trade policy. The 113 (now 133) Committee comprises senior civil servants and trade experts from the Member States. The Commission is also represented at the meetings (Bretherton and Vogler 1999: p. 52).  For a description of the principal-agent model see chapter 3.2.     PAGE  PAGE 1  )=Qstxy @ G H I   ! 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