



## State of the Art Report October 2004

Robert Kissack  
London School of Economics

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## Executive Summary

FORNET seeks to make an original and valuable contribution to the study of European Foreign Policy through answering the questions: what is it, who makes it and how? There are no straight answers to these questions because there is a vibrant, on-going debate across Europe about what European foreign policy is, and the purpose of FORNET is to both nurture and cultivate that debate. FORNET aims to engage in the debate and offer a new perspective on these central questions, principally by bringing together for the first time a network of researchers that span the existing EU membership and the accession states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. The geographical breadth of Europe is represented in FORNET and through the critical engagement of all..997724004 To



engaged in the study of international relations and of European foreign policy, and the network will provide opportunities for consolidating this development. In conclusion, these efforts to modernise, deepen and widen the debate of European foreign policy are the principal way FORNET is 'adding value' to the existing state of the art.

*ii. Role of the working groups*

There are five specific areas in which FORNET has divided its members into working groups  
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scene in which NATO, the USA and Russia are all also involved. As the EU develops relations of a new kind with NATO alongside the building up of the Common Security and Defence Policy, a broader dialogue and exchange of views with European partner institutes and academics is necessary.

#### *Group 4: The Evolution of ESDP*

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) can be regarded as a major issue in the imminent future from an institutional and a practical perspective. ESDP represents a more ambitious task than the CFSP and its evolution must be observed and theorised. The central question which guides both tasks is whether the ESDP will become a 'pillar within the pillar', or whether it will be smoothly integrated into the existing CFSP norms and procedures.

#### *Group 5: CFSP in a Regional Perspective: Dialogue, Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution*

In keeping with some of the issues raised above, the identity of the EU as an international actor has shaped the objectives of the CFSP into a more pronounced role of solving conflicts and contributing to stability in and around Europe, but also as a supporter of UN peacekeeping missions around the world. Crisis management, early warning and conflict prevention lie at the heart of this policy field with regard to the EU's immediate geographical neighbourhood in South Eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean. Further afield, the EU is working to improve cooperation with the UN, both on a military operation level and in post-conflict reconstruction.

#### *iii. Conclusions*

FORNET is working to take the emerging discipline of European foreign policy studies forward in a new and exciting way. It is building on an established framework of literature, approaches and experts, but represents a new chapter in the on-going debate about the role of Europe in the world. This new chapter represents the coming together of many particular events, including the forthcoming Enlargement, the adv

The theoretical dimension to FORNET's work is the continued refinement of theories and approaches to the study of the CFSP

The empirical challenge that awaits FORNET, (and all other investigations into the EU's foreign policy) is to link theory to practice. The empirical study of the EU as an international actor provides insights into which theories are useful and which are not, what things they miss out and what needs to be reconsidered. It also illustrates where new theory needs to be developed, because the existing repertoire does not provide the referential frameworks necessary to understand and explain the all actions of the EU. Empirical study is necessary; above all, because the EU is continually developing and the existing theory might or might not be useful in the future, depending on the course the EU follows. The current agenda empirical research focus on the impact of Enlargement, the drafting and finalisation of the Constitutional Treaty with the new provisions for an EU Foreign Minister spanning the role of External Relations DG and Secretary General of the Council. The creation of this post opens up new possibilities of action for the EU, and empirical research explores the course of action, becoming informative through the analysis of trends and then capable of explanatory power through theoretical modelling. In the past, the ratification of the St Malo agreement between Britain and France in December 1998 led to the development of the ESDP in the Cologne IGC the following June, which in turn developed the possibility of the EU becoming a military actor, (although limited to humanitarian and non-aggressive tasks). Keeping abreast of the evolution of the EU is the main task of FORNET's empirical work, and that dovetails neatly with its network of theorists who are then able to develop a greater understanding of the EU as a foreign policy actor; both its character and the nature of the foreign policy.

## Part 1: The Field of Study

Today's debate about European foreign policy contains a number of central themes running through it that have evolved over many years. In this section the central themes are first identified, then contextualised in a historical framework before finally being presented as an evolution of a new area of



DG of the European Commission which handles the relations between the EU and third states in areas of Community policy that contain an external dimension, and an institutional framework designed to coordinate the foreign policies of the member states so that they act consistently with one another. This framework is known as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and is situated in the second pillar of the EU structure. (The following section contains a historical explanation of how this came into existence). More recently, the CFSP was complemented by the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and as such these two institutions are an attempt to replicate at the EU-level the 'traditional' role performed by foreign ministries. Therefore, when asked whether foreign policy in the EU should be broadly or narrowly defined, there are inevitably mixed answers. For many years the EU (and before it the EC) conducted its 'external relations' with states outside the EU in policy areas that were not considered foreign policy, and thus not referred to by name. Simultaneously, the EU has been building up its capabilities to perform some of the actions undertaken by states through their foreign policies for over 30 years. The question of what constitutes EU foreign policy is linked to the more basic question of what constitutes foreign policy? (Hill 2002)

The second question to consider is whether foreign policy can be defined by the way it is made, or whether it is about the impact that it has. This question comes about as a direct consequence of the previous point raised. If it is becoming increasingly difficult to say with any certainty what constitutes foreign policy when it is defined by its subject matter, then an alternative line of enquiry is to link the definition of foreign policy in the EU to the method by which it is created. Since the EU is based upon the Treaty of Rome and its subsequent amendments, the CFSP represents the location from which foreign policy originates, and moreover, the treaties clearly state the mechanisms through which decisions must be made. The alternative approach to take is similar to that used by Hazel Smith, who argued that the real measure of the effectiveness of a foreign policy is the impact that it makes around the world. (Smith 2002) Adopting this approach rejects the distinctions between pillars, and rejects the separation of economic and political policies into external relations and foreign policy. In 1977 Gunnar Sjöstedt proposed a similar method to measure the degree to which the EC was becoming an international actor, but rejected it because he considered it to be too broad a task at the time. However, he agreed with the assertion that there should be no distinction between economic and political policies in their contribution to foreign policy, and questioned too whether there was a legitimate distinction between internal and external policy. 'There is perhaps no use in making any distinction at all between foreign policy and other aspects of the activities of the EC.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.25)

The final question asks whether the character of the EU influences its foreign policy. There are three broad strands to the case made asserting this, and each emphasises a different aspect of the

EU's character as being influential. The first concentrates on how the material capabilities of the EU influence the sorts of foreign policies it advocates and the sort of policy instruments it uses. The EU is widely accepted to be a powerful economic actor that achieves significant leverage through the single market and the regulation of goods and services into it. It is also the leading donor of Official Development Aid (ODA) and exerts considerable influence over many states in the developing world. (Smith 1997; Smith 1998; Ginsberg 2001; Holland 2002; Smith 2002) The EU has used its presence in the international economic system to attach conditionality clauses to its commercial and overseas development assistance programmes to promote economic and political reform, including the promotion of human rights. As recent research by Karen E. Smith shows, the EU very rarely applies sanctions and prefers instead to induce cooperation through extending incentives. (Smith 2003) This has led to the labelling of the EU as a 'civilian power' because it pursues its foreign policy through economic means, (and preferably through 'carrots' rather than 'sticks'), rather than through the threat or actual use of military force. The second way in which the character of the EU has influenced its foreign policy is through the promotion of values as ends in themselves, and not simply as prerequisites for economic assistance.<sup>1</sup> (Manners 2002) Manners' argument is based on a reading of the legal treaties of the EU and on the references made in them to the rule of international law, the upholding of the UN Charter and the conduct of international relations in accordance to it, which leads him to conclude that the EU is a 'normative power'. The final characteristic singled out for its influence over foreign policy is the institutional structure of the EU. Richard Whitman suggests that the formalised *internal* relations between EU states based on international treaties has led the EU to conduct its *external* relations in a similar manner, by attempting to export its principles (Whitman 1998). In effect, the way the EU makes its foreign policy influences the output from the process too – although this is principally attributable to the success of the EU at creating a strong and stable polity based on international law.

More questions will be raised during the course of this report, looking at the nature and extent of cooperation between member states in the EU and how common positions and joint actions are made. Another issue that will be tackled in due course is the action of member states acting alone, in the context of their bi-lateral relations with states outside the EU, and how these relations fit into the jigsaw of EU foreign policy.

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<sup>1</sup> The five principal values are: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. There are four 'minor' norms too: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance.

## *ii. Historical Heritage and New Challenges*

In 1969 at the Hague Summit, the issue of the imbalance between the EC's economic and political power was addressed. The document produced by the six members urged 'paving the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and missions'.<sup>2</sup> The meeting commissioned a report from the Belgian Political Director Vicomte Davignon that has become referred to as the Luxembourg Report of 1970. The report outlined the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC) that would be used to further the EC's political position in the world. In it, it stated:

The objectives of this co-operation are as follows:

- to ensure, through regular exchanges of information and consultations, a better mutual understanding on the great international problems;
- to strengthen their solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of their views, the co-ordination of their positions, and, where it appears possible and desirable,
- common actions.<sup>3</sup>

The process grew throughout the 1970s with successive reports (the Copenhagen Report in 1973 and the London Report in 1981) that incrementally increased the ties between the foreign offices of the EC members and through this gradual socialisation process instilled a cooperative instinct between members. From the outset EPC was separate from the decision-making process of the EC. The role of Commission officials was ne.i Tc 0.2972s6,04 Tc 0.0424 Tw 125360 12 221.58003 417comm93 Tm(Commissiough thi



This was coupled to a reform of the Troika system<sup>6</sup> and the setting up of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) within the Council secretariat in order to make the CFSP more proactive and less reactive to crisis situations. Turning to the definition of instruments, four categories were defined in Article J2 of the TEU.

- *Principles and Guidelines:* 'The European Council shall define the principles of and general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications.' *Art J.3 para. 1 (TEU)*
- *Common Strategies:* 'The European Council shall decide upon common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.' *Art. J.3 para. 2 (TEU)*
- *Joint Actions:* 'The Council shall adopt joint actions. Joint actions shall address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required. They shall lay down their objectives, scope, the means to be made available to the Union, if necessary their duration, and the conditions for their implementation.' *Art. J.4 para. 1 (TEU)*
- *Common Positions:* 'The Council shall adopt common positions. Common positions shall define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of geographical or thematic nature. Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the common positions.' *Art. J.5 (TEU)*

The CFSP decision-making procedure was altered in the Amsterdam Treaty, to allow qualified majority voting in areas where a Common Strategy had (unanimously) been agreed by the European Council first, and introduced the a 'constructive abstention' to areas where unanimity is still required for action.

'Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting in unanimity. Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions. When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept the decision commits the Union.' *Art. J.13 para. 1 (TEU)*

The EU became a more coherent military actor after Britain and France signed the St Malo declaration (1998) and paved the way for the incorporation of the Western European Union (WEU) into the EU as the defensive component in the 1999 Cologne IGC. For a full discussion of the EU as a military actor, see Part 3, section ii.

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<sup>6</sup> The old Troika system comprised of the Past, Present and Future EU Presidencies, with the Commission, while the new Troika comprised of the Present and Future EU Presidencies, the Council Secretary General and the Commission.



## Part 2: Theoretical perspectives

This section looks at the progress made towards understanding what a European foreign policy is, in terms of how it is created, how decisions are made within it and what effects it causes – in the change of behaviour of EU members, in the change of behaviour of other (third) states and finally change to the international system itself. None of the theories here answer all of these questions, but each one contributes something to one, and often more than one, of them.

### *i. Comparative Politics Based Models*

Comparative politics based models build upon the understanding that politics belongs within the realm of the state, and that the EU is best understood as being a construction with its foundations in the member states. The core concerns begin with making the EU appear legitimate in the eyes of the citizens of Europe, since the EU is regarded as a political project for the purpose of improving the security and prosperity of the population of member states. The many institutions of the EU are built in two directions from the citizens of Europe. The first direction is horizontally across them, in the form of the European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which are EU institutions with a direct linkage to the citizenry, either through direct suffrage or the direct right of appeal. The second direction is vertically above them, in the form of the Council and the Commission which act through the governments and civil services of the member states to give a higher (supranational or intergovernmental) plane of coordination. These institutions remain indirectly accountable to the citizens of Europe through their national parliaments and through the EP.<sup>7</sup> Three competing ideas will be contrasted from this school of theory emphasising the roots of the EU in the democracies of the member states.

The first is the classical integration theory of neo ind





states have their hands on the reins that control the Union. Furthermore, the purpose of the EU is clear – to deliver a higher level of utility to the constituents of the member states than would not be possible if the states worked alone – and therefore it is in the national interest to belong and cooperate in the EU, provided that the benefits of cooperation outweigh the costs of membership. As states become more used to calculating their national utility through their shared interests in the EU, they become willing to forgo total control in some areas (such as those in pillar one where decision-making follows the Community method) because they begin to calculate long-term strategies where net gains are assumed to be greater than losses. In this approach to understanding the EU domestic political support is very important because it emphasises for whom the whole project is for. Unlike neofunctional theory, there is no inherent logic that predicts established practices in one policy area will spill over to another. The same rational understanding of the interests of the member states can be used to explain why there is less cooperation in the CFSP. Firstly, the national gains are less clear; secondly the process is younger and has yielded few gains; thirdly, as a result there is little confidence that it is a productive area to share decision making responsibilities because there is no evidence that a long-term strategy will yield long-term benefits. (Gordon 1997) With this conclusion, Liberal Intergovernmentalism falls into a common trap associated with rational choice models, namely that the state preferences that determine rational choices are fixed and there is no opportunity to challenge the existing logic that EU states cannot gain from a CFSP.<sup>8</sup>

The third type of theory looks at how the different institutions in the EU work together to form a new form of political structure that is neither a totally separate European level of government as in the neofunctionalist model nor strictly national as in Liberal Intergovernmentalism. The background of this theoretical perspective is the close study of the institutional framework of the EU, and its analysis in the classical political science

acting in both the executive and the legislative bodies. Yet rather than see this as a misrepresentation of the national model, political theorists have posited that this is a new form of political representation through a new form of policy-creating mechanism, as seen in Wessels' fusion thesis. (Rometsch and Wessels 1996) The system is between the national and the European level and has come about as a result of the high level of collusion between the Commission and national representatives. The most important aspect of this system is that it has been observed in formation for many years but appears to have reached a plateau and has become established as the accepted policy-making system, to the point where new member states are being socialised into it.

## *ii. International Relations Theory Based Models*

As mentioned in section (2.i.), International Relations (IR) based theories look at the EU from the opposite perspective from comparative politics based approaches. Rather than seeing the EU as a higher level of political cooperation above and across the states of Europe, IR based theories see the EU as a form of cooperation between states. The difference can be summarised as being a bottom-up approach in the former case, and a top-down approach in the latter case. Theories of IR contest the nature of the relations between states and the theories can be differentiated by the assumptions they make concerning the nature of the international system. The principal division between theories are those that assume that cooperation is possible between states, (rationalist, liberals, institutionalists) and those that do not, (realists). Common to all approaches is the acceptance of the fact that there is no world government based on a coercive authority above sovereign states, and that the international system is fundamentally different from any



states will not enter into cooperative agreements even when international common goods are attainable that would not be so without cooperation because a state's priority is the preservation of the hierarchical order of power. A cooperative agreement between two states, (X and Y) will rarely benefit both equally, and if an agreement should benefit Y more than X, state X's position in the hierarchy of states will be worsened relative to state Y, which will either close the gap on X if it is weaker, or increase it if it is stronger. Thus the *relative* gains made by states are deemed more important than the *absolute* gains made. Such calculations are based on an assumption of a zero-sum equation. (For a reassertion of realist concerns for relative and absolute power, and as an answer to regime theories, see Grieco (Grieco 1988)). Regime theory relaxes this assumption, emphasising that states may prioritise the gains made possible through cooperation more than the outcome of relative gains, or that certain cooperative agreements lead to gains that cannot be measured in terms of power relations. Regime theorists continue to assume that the state is a rational unitary actor and apply rational choice theory to explain the behaviour of states within cooperative regimes. However, while regime theory breaks the static cycle of realism by assuming positive gains, it assumes that the interests of states are constant and has difficulty explaining how regimes evolve through time. Thus behavioural models can explain how the EU (or EC as it was) came into existence as a group of unequal states behaving as equals, because of its focus on comparative not absolute gains. Yet the theory has difficulty explaining why the members pursued ever-closer integration due to the fact that their national interests are assumed to be fixed.

Setting out these theories along a continuum between structure and agency illustrates where they lie in relation to each other and in relation to other theories here. Realism provides a structure-centric approach to understanding the international system which can only understand the role of the EU as an international actor if it is subsumed into its structural model of international politics. Regime theory relaxes structural assumptions that allow states to enter into international organisations and therefore attributes some agency to the states in their initial decision to form a united Europe, but still makes the behaviour of states explicable through the permanent tension between cooperating for specific ends and the likelihood of the regime failing to yield the desired returns that compensate for the costs of association. Before moving on to look at the application of these approaches to the study of the foreign policy of the EU (Section iv), the next section will briefly sketch out the wider horizon of current IR theory.

### *iii. IR theory beyond agency and structure*

International Relations theory has moved on from the structure and agency debate in two ways.

to draw on radical critiques of positivist approaches to social science research that have focused on the underlying epistemological assumptions, such as the difficulty of objectively postulating that particular factors are more important than others. Let us consider both in turn. There a number of sociological works that have informed the IR discipline, and one of the most widely used is Anthony Giddens' structuration theory.<sup>12</sup> For Giddens, both structure and agency are mutually reinforcing, since the parameters of agency are continually bounded by structure, yet structure alone is not permanent but needs to be continually reinforced through the actions of agents being bound by it. Therefore, agency defines structure, (i.e. what is and is not possible), yet agency is limited by the structure that it has carried forward. This means that over time, the gradual expans

Gramsci's work. It emphasizes the role of ideas in the world system. Historical investigation can uncover the real nature of power-relations, but critical theory must also argue against the way global political relations are portrayed by the hegemonic blocs, because it is in the blocs' interests to perpetuate their advantageous situation through the perpetuation of the *status quo*. Ideas, in the form of widely held beliefs about the way the world works, help the hegemonic blocs consolidate and maintain the mechanisms which they control the world system through, mechanisms which are the product of history and circumstance. Realism has already been mentioned, and another example of a theory that critical theorists challenge is that of neo-liberal economics.<sup>13</sup> The third aspect of critical theory is its application to the politics of counter-hegemonic movements. Critical theory is able to construct an agenda for changing the current political order in the world by uncovering the historical roots of the present, and by challenging the arguments made for its preservation. By doing both of these things, it presents the material and ideational steps required to achieve change in the global system.

Criticism of the prevailing assumptions in International Relations theory has also been made from a gender perspective. While critical theory challenges the underlying assumptions concerning the nature of power relations vis-à-vis historical forces and material and ideational preservation, the study of gender in international relations claims to expose the bias towards male imagery in the language and conceptual tools used to explain the world. One of the leading theorists in this field is Cynthia Weber. (Weber 1995; Weber 1999) Gender perspectives on international relations highlight a number of ways in which gender issues are overlooked, from the predominance of men in positions of political power and in military inst



#### *iv. Theories of a European Foreign Policy*

The first approach that looks specifically at the creation of foreign policy in the EU is the work done in adapting Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) to a European level. (Hill 1996; done in adapt





member states. The ideational component of their work is the perception of the EU as an actor in the eyes of third countries in the world. They argue that being seen as an actor is as important as having the sovereign credentials of an actor, and that the visibility of the EU as actor in the areas of trade, development and the environment (as well as in security and peacekeeping but to a lesser degree) is enormously important in the foreign policies of the majority of the states in the world and this gives the EU *presence* in the world. The material or structural component of the work is the degree to which the EU is given the *opportunity* to act. As the EU is seen as being a larger presence in the world, it is in the interests of the EU and third states to give the EU more opportunities to become involved in decision-making forum and in particular the multilateral system (where many of the fields in which the EU is strongest are internationally regulated). By taking these opportunities to act, the EU increases its *capabilities* as an actor and makes itself more important. By increasing its importance, it has more presence in the world and the cyclic process begins again. Bretherton and Vogler argue that the limits to what the EU can do in the world are not set by concepts such as sovereignty, which was the traditional necessity to act in the international system. Instead, the other members of the international system decide the 'rules' by deciding if they are willing to interact with an actor. As third countries choose to see the EU as an international actor, and by the EU taking advantage of these opportunities and furthering its presence, the structure of the international system is determined by the actions of its members. Agency and structure are continual motion and continually redefining each other.

While the use of constructivist theory is relatively new in its application to IR, similar approaches have been used to study the EU for a long time. In 1977, Gunnar Sjöstedt asked the question: how does one measure the degree to which the EC is an international actor? Not only is this question similar to those asked above, the answers which were given are strikingly similar to the constructivist approaches developed two years later. Sjöstedt posited that the evolution of the EC as an international actor was a process that involved internal and external change, stating that 'the growth of a new international actor probably is an extremely complex process, influenced both by the processes of integration between the nations involved and by the interaction of the integrating group with the external world.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.4) Sjöstedt attempted to model the variables necessary to determine whether the EC was *becoming* an international actor, and chose to focus on the internal evolution of the EC, rather than its impact in the external environment, which he judged to be too complex a task. Instead, the measure of actorness chosen was 'actor capability', which Sjöstedt defined as behaviour 'actively and deliberately in relations to other actors in the international system.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.16) Actor capability was in turn operationalised through a set of 'structural prerequisites' and 'actor behaviour', which he went on to define in detail. 'Actor behaviour should always be thought of as a transaction going from the Community to some recipient in the outside world. A transaction, in turn, means that some object is

transferred from the Community to the recipient.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.21) Not only did Sjöstedt conceptualise the concept of actorness in relation to the EC/EU in the international system, but he also stated clearly early on that 'there is perhaps no use in making any distinction at all between foreign policy and other aspects of the activities of the EC.' (Sjöstedt 1977 p.25)

### Part 3: Empirical Application

Theoretical approaches to conceptualising European foreign policy are only useful when questions are asked about real events. The purpose of theory is to make the answers to questions better because they set out a framework in which to fit all the relevant pieces of information in. In this section five areas are considered and they represent the issues about which the majority of questions are asked.

#### *i. National Foreign Policy*

Since efforts to coordinate the foreign policies of the European states began with EPC in 1970, academics have pursued an empirical research agenda that has tried to witness EPC in action and measure the areas in which it was successful and the rate of progress. Given that the point of departure of this study was six autonomous national foreign policies, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) of the member states constitutes the first area in which empirical studies were made, and Hill was among the forerunners in this field. (Hill 1983) This area of study made two significant contributions to the future direction that EFP studies would take. The first was the identification of a 'European' level

## *ii. Civilian Power*

The doctrine of the EU as a civilian power dates back to Francois Duchêne in 1972 when he suggest that Europe's relative military weakness would become less detrimental to its ability to project its power because its strength in trade and economy was becoming more important in a world where the structural balance between hard and soft power was tilting in favour of the latter.<sup>16</sup> The central core of the thesis was that the preferred foreign policy instruments for wielding influence in the international system would shift against the continued use of military power. Given that this structural shift was underway, Europe was in a position to increase its influence on world politics through the changing international system, that seemed to favour the existing strengths of the EC (or EU today) and mitigate against its weaknesses. This argument continues to find favour

interdependence is a more effective tool of persuasion than the recourse to military force. Therefore the civilian power thesis lends credence to advocates of a wide definition of foreign policy, and to those who argue that the international system is not static but subject to the influence of actors upon it. This is demonstrated in both the relative demise of military power as a useful foreign policy tool and the increased prominence of normative values and economic concerns in the creation and implementation of foreign policy.

### *iii. Military Power*

In 1983, Hedley Bull responded to Francois Duchêne's suggestion of civilian power by stating that power needed to be premised on military strength. (see footnote 13). Bull concluded that there was little chance that the EC would be an actor in international politics because at the time the possibility that the EU would develop its own military forces seemed fanciful. During the Cold War military coordination was predominantly through NATO, (with a small role for the Western European Union), and Europe could neither contemplate its existence outside the NATO alliance, nor imagine itself as becoming a rival superpower. The end of the Cold War led to the structural change in the world system that allowed the newly formed EU to reconsider its role in the world. The end of superpower patronage networks throughout the world meant that the EU could construct a coherent foreign policy concerning the developing world (through its

specifically mandated to perform since 1992, which included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and crisis management tasks including peacemaking. These roles were set out in the Petersberg Declaration and became known as the Petersberg tasks. Six months later at the Helsinki IGC the conclusions stated that the Council had agreed that 'cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year military forces of up to 50000-60000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.' (para. 28) Thus with a military component at its disposal, the EU has set about creating a formalised policy for its utilisation in the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

#### *iv. Institutional and Legal Developments*

The study of the institutional structure of the EU and the legal developments within it is primarily concerned with two things. The first is to identify trends in the evolution of the legal constitution and the structural design of the EU to ascertain the changing roles of the vari







own values abroad and into the national political systems of third states. However, now that this instrument has been used once, the question arises of whether it will be used again, and if so, to which countries and for how much longer? It is directly related to the question of where the EU ends, to which Zielonka responds that while the EU as an idea is limitless, the EU as a material reality must have a physical border to prevent itself being spread too thin and risk collapsing. (Zielonka 1998) A resource providing a lot more information on the liberty and security within the EU and the role of the external border in promoting both of these values can be found on the website of the *ELISE: European Liberty and Security*, which looks at security issues, social cohesion and institutional development of the European Union at:

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