

Eduardo Baistrocchi (ed), *A Global Analysis of Tax Treaty Disputes*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017, 2 vols, 1,588 pp, £300.00.

Eduardo Baistrocchi's *A Global Analysis of Tax Treaty Disputes* provides an unprecedented collection of expertly written reviews of the tax treaty disputes in OECD countries, BRICS countries and beyond. Each of the country reporters – a particularly impressive group of renowned experts in the field – provides a comprehensive analysis of tax treaty disputes in their respective jurisdictions. They all responded to a standardised questionnaire formulated by the editor, which sought answers to a wide and thoughtful set of questions. The questionnaire, and the experts' replies, left no stone unturned. They covered a wide variety of issues and perspectives: they considered the economic context, the domestic structure of the law for solving tax interpretation disputes, the effect of strategic considerations in interpreting treaties, the use of soft law (eg, the OECD commentary) as a viable interpretive source and the potential differences between active and passive income. The contributors explored the dynamics of tax treaty interpretation, and, importantly, sought to draw a picture of the evolutionary path of treaty interpretation, discussing their convergence among. Finally, the questionnaire invited the reporters' evaluation regarding the future of tax treaty interpretation disputes.

This comprehensive survey provides 'the first practical implementation of the suggestion made by Klaus Vogel and Rainer Prokisch that a central collection of cases concerning the application of tax treaties should be established to facilitate the work of courts around the world' (7-8). Moreover, one of the key contributions of this book is to provide the groundwork for a 'big picture', comparative perspective on treaties and their interpretation, in search of global trends and directions. It allows us to draw comparisons between countries (and

basis 'the extent to which the 2015 BEPS Reports trigger structural changes in the patterns of tax treaty disputes' (8). This is indeed an invaluable source of information for tax practitioners as well as researchers studying the turbulent area of international taxation, and of particular importance in the current era of international taxation when the scope and depth of international cooperation are being considered.

The enormous amount of information which the book provides as well as its thorough analysis demonstrate an increasing convergence of tax treaties gravitating towards the OECD model. The book highlights the network structure of international taxation, which has evolved over the years from a mechanism that ameliorates international double taxation to 'a platform that fosters international tax competition among virtually all jurisdictions in the world' (1456, 1540). It seems to leave open the question of whether a international tax regime exists – and allows readers to make their own informed decision about that. Whether states feel obliged to conform with

the international regime or not, the clear result, according to this book, is that they increasingly converge towards a uniform standard – the compatible standard of the OECD model tax convention.

The detailed survey offered by the participants of the project allowed Baistrocchi together with political scientist Martin Hearson to produce an illuminating quantitative analysis, exploring variations among jurisdictions, developments across time and nuances in the application of the standard among countries. Drawing on this analysis, they conclude that ‘the core architecture of the ITR is a “Co-opetition” game implemented by means of a two sided platform’, where countries apply their differing competitive powers based on the joint platform of the OECD model’s standard. In this depiction of international taxation, the soft laws produced by a small group of countries create a platform, ‘On one side of the platform, the central users are leading jurisdictions . . . on the other side of the platform, the central users are international investors . . .’ (1541). Countries, it is argued, engage in international tax competition within a compatible standard – the compatible standard of the OECD model tax convention (1455, 1538–1546). ‘Indeed’, the book argues, ‘all G20 and beyond countries have been increasingly using OECD-based legal technology in international taxation. Tax treaties and relevant domestic tax regulations are increasingly grounded on concepts compatible with those of the OECD MTC’ (1455).

Network theory has an important explanatory power in the context of international taxation. In particular, it helps to explain the convergence of states’ policies into the single standard of what has come to be called an international tax regime. When successful, compatible standards facilitate such convergence, encouraging members to join the network and stay within it. Telecommunication networks – where the value of a telephone or a fax machine increases with every additional user – are a famous example of a compatible standard which becomes more attractive the greater the number of users that apply it. By joining or staying in a network, users benefit from the compatibility with other users, and thus have an inherent incentive to join and stay within the network. Similarly, in the area of international taxation, the tax treaty network sets standard patterns of interaction across jurisdictions, thus saving much of the



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One important conclusion of the book is that ‘the OECD and G20 should attempt to move the ITR to a new and better equilibrium point: more transparency in all central dimensions of this strategic game’ (1545). Another interesting result of the book’s quantitative analysis is that procedural articles in treaties have been consistently less litigated than other, more substantive articles. Therefore, the book argues, focusing on the procedural aspects of the current standard may prove more productive in facilitating a shift towards an improved