EC476
Contracts and Organisations
This information is for the 2020/21 session.
Teacher responsible
Prof Gilat Levy 32L.4.31 and Prof Philippe Aghion 32L.2.02
Availability
This course is available on the MSc in Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, MSc in Economics, MSc in Economics (2 Year Programme) and MSc in Environmental Economics and Climate Change. This course is available with permission as an outside option to students on other programmes where regulations permit.
Pre-requisites
Students on the MSc Econometrics and Mathematical Economics programme must have completed the Pre-sessional Course for MSc EME (EC451).
All other students must have completed the Introductory Course in Mathematics and Statistics (EC400).
In exceptional circumstances, students may take this course without EC400 provided they meet the necessary requirements and have received approval from the course conveners (via a face to face meeting), the MSc Economics Programme Director and their own Programme Director. Contact the Department of Economics for more information (econ.msc@lse.ac.uk) regarding entry to this course.
Course content
The course will cover topics from: social learning, reputation and career concerns, strategic information transmission, contract theory, incomplete contracts, the economics of moral hazard and adverse selection in strategic settings, dynamic theory of incentive contracts, optimal auctions and regulation, and the theory of mechanism design with multiple agents (multiple agents screening and common agency).
Teaching
20 hours of lectures and 10 hours of seminars in the MT. 20 hours of lectures and 10 hours of seminars in the LT.
This year at least for Michaelmas Term, some or all of this teaching may have to be delivered through a combination of virtual webinars, online videos, and virtual classes.
Formative coursework
Two marked assignments per term.
Indicative reading
No one book covers the entire syllabus; a list of references will be provided at the start of the course. The following textbooks provide a treatment of part of the material presented in the course: Jean-Jacques Laffont, The Economics of Uncertainty and Information, MIT Press; D Fudenberg & J Tirole, Game Theory, MIT Press; Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement Regulations, MIT Press; Bernard Salanié, The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press, Bolton, P., and M. Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press, Hart, O. (1995), Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press.
Assessment
Assessment path 1
Exam (100%, duration: 2 hours, reading time: 15 minutes) in the summer exam period.
Assessment path 2
Exam (50%, duration: 2 hours, reading time: 15 minutes) in the summer exam period.
Essay (50%, 6000 words) in the ST.
MSc Econometrics and Mathematical Economics students must follow Assessment path 1.
Non-MSc Econometrics and Mathematical Economics students must follow Assessment path 2.
Important information in response to COVID-19
Please note that during 2020/21 academic year some variation to teaching and learning activities may be required to respond to changes in public health advice and/or to account for the situation of students in attendance on campus and those studying online during the early part of the academic year. For assessment, this may involve changes to mode of delivery and/or the format or weighting of assessments. Changes will only be made if required and students will be notified about any changes to teaching or assessment plans at the earliest opportunity.
Key facts
Department: Economics
Total students 2019/20: 19
Average class size 2019/20: 19
Controlled access 2019/20: Yes
Value: One Unit
